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CONTRACT VERSUS CONTRACTARIANISM: THE
REGULATORY ROLE OF CONTRACT LAW
JEAN BRAUCHER*
Legal theorists in recent years have deployed "contract" as a central
concept to explain more and more topics. These theorists seek to replace
"regulation" with "freedom of contract," or, where actual contracts are not
feasible, they seek to use the supposed results of hypothetical contracts. The
legal approach of these theorists, which I shall call "contractarianism," has
moved beyond the long-standing concern of political theorists with the basic
structure of society' to address such concrete legal questions2 as the appropriate
rules to govern corporate actors3 and bankruptcy reorganizations. 4 In the
* Kraft W. Eidman Centennial Visiting Professor in Law, University of Texas School
of Law (1990-91), and Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. A paper
based on this article was presented at the Second Annual International Conference on Socio-
Economics of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, at George Washington
University, in March, 1990. The author thanks John Applegate, Gordon Christenson, Ronald
Collins, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Jay Feinman, Peter Linzer, Joseph Perillo, David Skover,
Joseph Tomain and David Wohl for valuable comments on earlier drafts.
1. See, e.g., J. RAwis, A THEoRY oF JusTIcE (1971); Gray, Contractarian Method,
Private Property, and the Market Economy in NoMos XXXI: MARKETs AND JUSTICE 13 (J.
W. Chapman & J. R. Pennock, ed., 1989); Rawls, The Basic Structure As Subject, in V.LUE.S
AND MoRAJ.s 47 (A.I. Goldman & J. Kim, eds. 1978).
2. See Brilmayer, Consent, Contract and Territory, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1989)
(critiquing consent theory of jurisdiction and noting that sovereign jurisdiction poses questions
of political theory in a concrete context).
3. See Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1990); Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 CoLUM.
L. Rnv. 1395-1774 (1989) (symposium); Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a
Corporation, 15 J. of Corp. L. 377 (1990) (critiquing contractarianism in corporate law).
4. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain,
91 YALE L. J. 857, 860 (1982) (viewing bankruptcy as system designed to simulate agreement
creditors would have made absent transaction costs).
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context of this onward sweep of contractarianism into particular legal fields,
it is useful to re-examine the nature of the legal institution of contract.
"Contract" refers in this article to legally enforceable agreements and
associated legal obligations.6 An examination of the difference between a
contractarian view of the nature of contract and the actual nature of contract
is a powerful method to reveal weaknesses of contractarian approaches to
legal fields.
How do contractarians-particularly legal theorists who promote con-
tract theories of particular legal topics-conceive of contract? Their views
of the nature of contract are often implicit, rather than discussed, so the
answer to the question is not easy to formulate. Another difficulty is
presented by the fact that contractarian theorists to some extent use the
idea of contract metaphorically.7 Nonetheless, it seems fair to conclude that
contractarian theorists contemplate binding obligations when they speak of
5. Concerning the sweeping extension of contractarianism, see Coleman, Comment:
Rights, Markets, and Community, 11 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 649, 649 (1988):
As communitarians characterize liberalism, all important socio-political, economic
and legal institutions are contractual, or market based; and justice itself can be
treated as the outcome of a rational contract among idealized, individually rational
autonomous agents.
Id.
6. This usage, which is not meant as a formal definition, is consistent with the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979) in that it requires legal recognition for an obligation
to be contractual. However, because I adopt a relational view of contracts (as will be discussed),
I do not accept the Restatement's dependence on "promise" for a definition of contract. The
Restatement defines contract as: "a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the
law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979). "Promise" is defined from an objective
(external) perspective as a "manifestation of intention" that justifies "a promisee in under-
standing that a commitment has been made." Id. at § 2(l).
The phrase "associated legal obligations" in the text is intended to refer to the idea that
much of contract law does not depend on agreement in any meaningful sense. The phrase
takes in obligations derived from common law, statutes and administrative regulations. All of
these forms of law are regulatory.
7. See Bratton, The 'Nexus of Contracts' Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL
L. REv. 407, 410 (1989) (describing various ways to understand the idea that a firm is a
"nexus of contracts," including that this idea is a metaphor).
For a more literal version of the contractual theory of the corporation, see Butler, The
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEo. MASON U. L. Rav. 99, 100 (1989):
The contractual theory of the corporation is in stark contrast to the legal concept
of the corporation as an entity created by the state. The entity theory of the
corporation supports state intervention-in the form of either direct regulation or
the facilitation of shareholder litigation-in the corporation on the ground that the
state created the corporation by granting it a charter. The contractual theory views
the corporation as founded in private contract, where the role of the state is limited
to enforcing contracts. In this regard, a state charter merely recognizes the existence
of a "nexus of contracts" called a corporation .... Moreover, freedom of contract
requires that parties to the nexus of contracts must be allowed to structure their
relations as they desire.
Id.
This passage relies on a false distinction between regulation and contract. Enforceable
contract is created by the state, and contract enforcement entails regulation.
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contracts. At the same time, however, contractarians neglect the implications
of the fact that contracts are not self-enforcing. Contractarians view non-
contractual legal approaches as "regulatory;" in contrast, they see contract
as a device by which parties control their relations and achieve their desires
by consent.' Their approach thus misconceives contract because all law,
including contract, is regulatory.
Actual contract does not reflect contractarianism's single-minded pursuit
of individualism. Enforceable contract is a societal institution that sets the
limits within which parties may exercise some degree of control over their
legal liability. Contract law also defines parties' obligations to a large extent.
Mediating between private ordering and social concerns, contract is a socio-
economic institution that requires an array of normative choices. Contract
thus is not contractarian. Contractarianism's central metaphor is weak to
describe its aims, for the reason that its fantasy of radical individualism is
impossible as the basis of actual contract law. The questions addressed by
contract law concern what social norms to use in the enforcement of
contracts, not whether social norms will be used at all.
Use of the concept of consent seems to be inevitable in explanations
and justifications of the law of contract. 9 Consent itself, however, is a
conclusion based on a complex set of normative judgments; consent is not
a simple description of fact.10 In the event of a dispute between contracting
8. For a description of contract law that focuses on full party control, see Barnett, A
Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLuM. L. REv. 269, 297-98 (1986) [hereinafter Consent
Theory]. After calling contract the law that governs "the valid transfer of entitlements,"
Barnett explains:
The rules governing alienation of property rights by transfer perform the same
function as rules governing their acquisition and those specifying their proper content:
facilitating freedom of human action and interaction. Freedom of action and
interaction would be seriously impeded, and possibly destroyed, if legitimate rights
holders who have not acted in a tortious manner could be deprived of their rights
by force of law without their consent. Moreover, the moral requirement of consent
mandates that others take the interests of the rights holder into account when seeking
to obtain the rights she possesses.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The flaws of this approach are addressed in Part IA, infra.
9. See A.W.B SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 5-6 (1975)
(defining contract in terms of consent and noting the difficulty of defining contract in way
that does not assume elements of doctrine specific to time and place). Simpson adopts for the
purposes of inquiry a "loose working definition of contract law as the law governing the legal
effect of those consensual transactions which have been regarded as giving rise to a relationship
of obligation." Id. at 6. Simpson's definition uses the terminology of consent, but it recognizes
that obligation is broader than that to which there has been consent.
10. Philosophical writers often talk about consent as if we all know what it is and the
only interesting question is its significance. These writers seem to speak of consent almost as
though it were a "fact." See generally CONSENT: CONCEPT, CAPACITY, CoNDInoN s AND
CONTRAINTS (Papers from Sixth Annual Conference of American Section of the International
Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy) (L.T. Sargent, ed.) (1979).
They may elaborate that consent is a "voluntary agreement," or "an assumption of obligation"
that is "voluntary." Id. at 1, 159. But that sort of definition still leaves us with all the
questions addressed by contract law, including: what constitutes an agreement or an assumption
of obligation? what obligation has been agreed to or assumed? and when is an agreement or
assumption sufficiently voluntary?
1990]
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parties, some external power must first decide whether the parties have
consented in a valid manner and, if so, determine the scope of the consent.
Legal decisionmakers, serving collective societal norms, construct consent.
This process is unavoidably a means of regulation, one which fosters one
view or another of beneficial contractual relations. Consent will not work
as a rationale to enforce contracts without also bringing in social control
of the parties' affairs in the event of dispute.
Social control is inevitable in a system of contract enforcement. The
concept of consent is a means to recognize and impose social duties, and
in addition, consent as a rationale-however defined-has limits.' 2 Because
social norms are within as well as without individuals, however, parties to
contracts do not experience social definition of obligation as wholly im-
posed. 3
11. Legal enforcement of contracts is regulation of private affairs; it involves use of
state power. See Cohen, The Basis of Contract, in LAw AND THE SOCI ORDER 78-79, 103-
04 (1933) (reprinted from 46 HLv. L. REv. 533 (1933)). Cohen explains that a contract:
cannot be said to be ever generally devoid of all public interest. If it be of no
interest, why enforce it? For note that in enforcing contracts, the government does
not merely allow two individuals to do what they found pleasant in their eyes.
Enforcement, in fact, puts the machinery of the law in the service of one party
against the other. When that is worthwhile and how that should be done are
important questions of public policy.
Id. at 78-79. Enforcement is regulatory even when the state, through the institution of contract,
attempts to facilitate ordering by the parties. See Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM.
L. REv. 799, 810 (1941) (discussing "private agreement" as "regulation").
12. See Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L. J.
997, 1014 (1985) (describing contemporary view of contract law). Dalton states:
We understand that contract law is concerned at the periphery with the imposition
of social duties .... But we conceive the central arena to be an unproblematic
enforcement of obligations voluntarily undertaken.
Id. See also Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN.
SuRvEy OF AM. L. 139, 141 [hereinafter Uncontracts]. Linzer observes:
Although the bulk of academic writers recognize that there are many legitimate
occasions for the non-consensual imposition of contractual duties, the mainstream
[of academic writers] continues to believe strongly in the centrality of consent, though
with commonsense modifications.
Uncontracts at 141; Beermann, Book Review, 67 B.U.L. REv. 553, 555 (1987) (reviewing H.
COLLUNS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (1986)). According to Beermann:
The theoretical problem has been to break out of the conceptualization of contract
law as a core of facilitation of voluntary agreements with a periphery of regulation.
This project requires an explanation of the normative judgments that inform the
concept of voluntariness and an understanding of the values that determine when
and how contracts are enforced.
Id.
13. What seems to be needed to understand consent to contract is something like Amitai
Etzioni's "I&We paradigm":
The term highlights the assumption that individuals act within a social context, that
this context is not reducible to individual acts, and, most significantly, that the
social context is not necessarily or wholly imposed. Instead, the social context is, to
a significant extent, perceived as a legitimate and integral part of one's existence, a
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There are three essential dimensions to the regulatory role of contract
law. First, law and legal decisionmakers make interrelated determinations
concerning the validity of consent and the limits of consent as a rationale
for enforcement. Sometimes the law mandates or prohibits terms because
of validity problems, because the social limits of consent as a rationale have
been reached, or for both of these reasons in combination. Second, as part
of the process of interpreting whether a contract was formed and, if so,
the scope of contractual obligation, legal decisionmakers mold obligations
along socially desired lines. Interpretation cannot be neutral, but must be
done from some point of view. Third, the law must supply a great deal of
the content of contractual obligation. No matter how detailed parties are
in their planning, they will never plan for every contingency. (Nor is it
necessarily desirable that the law encourage them to try to do so). Supplied
terms reflect social views of the proper goals of contractual relations.
The mixed ideals served by contract law include government facilitation
of private ordering considered socially useful, protection of parties, and
reciprocity and a balance of power in exchange relations. 14 Those who
propose to look at more and more legal problems in terms of contract
would probably be disappointed with the results of employing actual contract
law. In the course of determining validity of consent and of interpreting
and supplying terms, contract law would reinvent the same sorts of regu-
latory constraints these theorists seek to escape.
For example, assuming no statutory or administrative limitation, a
contractual term permitting a corporate officer to take corporate opportu-
nities for his own benefit 5 would raise such questions of contract law as:
Did (enough?) shareholders and other affected parties (e.g., creditors,
employees) validly consent? Do the consequences of the term tend to point
out problems concerning the validity of consent to it? For example, did the
appropriate decisionmakers have sufficient information? In addition, what
does the term mean as applied? Suppose the corporate officer appropriated
all the good opportunities and left the bad ones for the corporation. In the
context of the particular relationship in question, did the term permit such
action by the corporate officer? If not, what background rule should be
used in the absence of a governing term supplied by the parties?
We, a whole of which the individuals are constituent elements.
A. ETO~ , THE MORAL DIMENsIoN-TowARD A NEw EcoNoMIcs 5 (1988). The "I&We
paradigm" seeks a balance between the individual and the community, and the annihilation
of neither. Id. at 8.
14. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, LmEA ASM AND THE LMITs OF JusTicE 105-09 (1982); Macneil,
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. L. REv. 854, 862, 895 (1978) [hereinafter Adjustment].
I remain a skeptic about the need for and the wisdom of a unified field theory of
contract, particularly a one-dimensional one; a good gray compromise statement of competing
concerns will probably do. See Hillman, Essay-The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67
TEXAS L. REv. 103 (1988) (reviewing current theoretical debates and presenting a "flexible,
pragmatic model").
15. This example is suggested by Butler & Ribstein, supra note 3, at 65.
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This article highlights the essential external normative (that is, regula-
tory) role of contract law in an effort to serve two goals. One is to defend
a traditional view of contract law, as serving multiple, sometimes competing
objectives, against recent assaults of a highly theoretical and individualistic
nature. The other goal is to detail the ways contractarian approaches to
other legal fields misapprehend and thus misappropriate contract. Contrac-
tarian approaches fail to recognize the complex regulatory character of
contract law. Part I of the article discusses three theories of contract, the
views of consent adopted under each theory, and how each theory addresses
or fails to address the three essential regulatory dimensions of contract law.
Part II elaborates on these three normative dimensions-determining validity
of consent and the limits of consent as a rationale, interpreting contractual
obligation and supplying terms. Each of the three subsections of Part II
discusses one of these normative dimensions, explaining why it is inescapable
and in addition explicating the particular normative choices reflected in
current American law.
I. THREE TiEoRIEs OF CONTRACT AND THEIR VIEWS OF CONSENT
Each of three contemporary theories of contract has a different view
of the nature of consent. Literal libertarian 16 theory views consent as an
express articulation of intentions at the outset, making elaborate provisions
for contingencies. The Chicago-style (Posnerian) law and economics theory
of contract conceives of consent as express in part, but also takes the
position that consent frequently must and should be fictional, based on an
assumption about what most people want (specifically, that most people
want wealth maximization). Both the literal libertarian and the Posnerian
theories of contract view consent as an event, something that occurs at the
outset of relations and defines obligations thereafter. In contrast, a relational
view of contract leads to a conception of consent as a process dependent
on particular norms of the relation as well as on norms of the broader
social context. Contractual relations, according to this third contemporary
theory, are embedded in and defined by social context. These three theories
have very different implications for questions of validity of consent and for
interpreting and supplying terms.
16. 1 prefer the term "libertarian," rather than "liberal," for modern writers such as
Robert Nozick and Randy Barnett who reject any element of communitarianism in their
political theory. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)); Barnett, Consent
Theory, supra note 8. The term "liberal" in contemporary scholarly usage suggests a richer
understanding of human nature (as including "dispositions to reasonableness and fairness").
Fallon, What is Republicanism and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1695, 1706
(1989).
Etzioni uses the term "Whigs" to describe Nozick, Friedrick Von Hayek, and Milton
Friedman, emphasizing the historical origins of their views and tweaking them as anachronistic.
A. ETzimom, supra note 13, at 6-8.
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A. Libertarian Consent Theory of Contract
If not for Randy Barnett, I might be accused of creating a straw man in
the form of the libertarian literal consent theorist. Here is Barnett's own
summary of his consent theory of contract:
A consent theory of contract requires that an enforceable contract
satisfy at least two conditions. First, the subject of a contract must
be a morally cognizable right possessed by the transferor that is
interpersonally transferable, or "alienable." Second, the possessor
of the alienable right must manifest his intention to be legally bound
to transfer the right-that is, he must consent.
17
This theory conceives of consent as express, conscious and individually
controlled. 8 In addition, a contract is a "transfer,"' 9 not a relation. A
discrete exchange is Barnett's paradigm of contract. Barnett believes his
version of consent serves freedom and individual automomy by giving each
party who consents control in dealings with other parties.
20
Barnett plays down two of the three inevitable external normative
dimensions of contract law, and he initially missed the third. He thus
ignores the complexity and the limits of consent.
First, Barnett gives scant attention to questions concerning validity of
consent and believes that validity can be summed up in an easy on/off
determination of "voluntariness.' 12 He also removes from the domain of
contract law questions about whether entitlements affect the validity of
consent.22 The legitimacy of entitlements is treated as a separate question,
a matter of property law, which in his view determines how persons can
acquire resources. He believes contract, in contrast, specifies how these
entitlements defined by property law can be tranferred. Barnett's analytical
structure cuts off inquiry into whether entitlements bear on the legitimacy
17. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CAurn. L. REv.
1969, 1978-79 (1987) [hereinafter Agency Law].
18. It is not a "will" theory, however, because it adopts an "objective" test of consent.
See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 8, at 272-74, 301, 303. Barnett accepts objectivism
quite willingly, but he does so because he believes this gives individuals more, not less, control
of their contracts; it protects individuals' "boundaries." Id. at 301. Barnett says that "an
inquiry into subjective intent would undermine the security of transactions by greatly reducing
the reliability of contractual commitments." Id. at 273. The objective test undermines "security
of contract" in another way, however, by directing a legal decisionmaker to judge parties'
words and conduct by external standards, not necessarily their own. This point is developed
in Part IIB, infra. Any system of legal enforcement of contracts will bring in social control
because an enforcement system charges legal decisionmakers to interfere to resolve disputes.
Barnett assumes that it is possible, and not particularly burdensome, for parties to communicate
to each other and at the same time to potential reviewing courts in "ordinary" ways.
19. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 8, at 292, 297, 303, 304.
20. Id. at 291, 297, 299 n.121.
21. See id. at 318-19. Barnett discusses validity in four paragraphs, as an afterthought
before his conclusion.
22. Id. at 270, 291-300.
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of consent to contract. Following Robert Nozick, Barnett rejects a patterned
view of distributive justice, treating a historical basis for entitlements as the
only appropriate approach, on the grounds that patterned theories "require
constant interferences with individual preferences." 23 This is circular rea-
soning-the individual preferences Barnett is concerned about protecting
depend upon the particular set of entitlements, so protection of preferences
cannot justify these entitlements. Furthermore, patterned distributive justice
need not depend on contract rules. Taxes and transfer payments are a more
effective primary means of maintaining a desired distributive pattern of
entitlements. 24 In addition, having adopted a historical approach to entitle-
ments, Barnett immediately backpedals from the principle of rectification it
entails. 21
Second, Barnett views interpretation to determine the fact and scope of
consent as a simple matter. He takes the position that consent is a "clear,
common sense test of enforceability." 26 Barnett adopts contract law's stan-
dard "objective" test of questions of formation and interpretation, but does
not address the difficulties of applying it. At one point, Barnett treats
application as uncomplicated: "If the word 'yes' ordinarily means yes, then
a subjective and unrevealed belief that 'yes' means no is generally immaterial
. "...-27 Barnett's statement invites comparison with the proposition that,
"No means no," which has not been treated as self-evident in the law of
rape. In rape law, consent historically has been socially constructed from a
male point of view, although there have been recent changes in the law
suggesting the development of a new perspective. 2 Consent to contract is
no less socially constructed, no matter what perspective is chosen as appro-
priate. 29 At another point, Barnett recognizes that "[tihe hard work facing
23. Id. at 286, 296. Nozick describes two conceptions of justice, a process-oriented,
historical one, as opposed to a time-slice, "patterned" conception, which looks at current
distribution. R. NozIcK, supra note 16, at 153-64. Nozick favors the process conception.
24. This point is discussed further in Part HAI, infra at notes 65-69.
25. Barnett sets the lifetimes of original wrongdoers and original owners as the statute
of limitations for redress of wrongful takings of resources. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra
note 8, at 296 n.113. Nozick gives the principle of rectification broad play but adds: "to
introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins would be to go too far." R. NozicK, supra
note 16, at 230-31.
26. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 8, at 271.
27. Id. at 303.
28. See Henderson, Review Essay: What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERK. WO MN's L.J.
193 (1987-88); Note, Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in
Rape, 6 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 143 (1983).
29. Peter Linzer, in contrast to Barnett, shows full awareness of the problem of what
constitutes consent and of the concept's expandability. At one point Linzer treats consent as
"conscious assent to terms at the moment a contract is formed." Linzer, Uncontracts, supra
note 12, at 139. Linzer also notes the possibility, however, that "we [could] stretch 'assent'
and 'consent' to mean nothing more than membership in a society." Linzer, Is Consent the
Essence of Contract?-Replying to Four Critics, 1988 ANN. SuRv. oF AM. L. 213, 218
[hereinafter Consent]; see Uncontracts, supra note 12, at 142. The latter statement implicitly
recognizes that consent is socially constructed when the concept of consent is stretched, but I
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any legal system" includes determining "what acts constitute 'consent,"'
but Barnett neglects to take on the job.30 What Barnett fails to recognize
is that legal interpretation inevitably involves social control of contract
parties.
A large flaw in Barnett's consent theory is its focus on formation, while
ignoring the very real and practical problem that the law must supply terms
where the parties are silent.3 Barnett has conceded that most "real-world"
contractual disputes do not involve issues of alienability of rights or of
whether the parties manifested consent to transfer rights. 2 More often, the
content of obligation is at issue.33 Barnett has made another even more
significant concession about his theory-that use of fictitious consent is
necessary to complete it and to supply terms:
Developing a consent theory's approach to construing contractual
intent when parties are silent on an issue would require a lengthy
and separate treatment. Such an effort would involve, among other
topics ... the presumption that the parties intended what most
similarly situated parties would have intended ex ante, thus putting
the onus on a minority of parties to express dissent.
3 4
Express consent was alluring to Barnett as a central concept because of
a false promise of full individual control. His quest was driven by radical
individualism and a libertarian view of human nature. Barnett believes that
it is possible to separate an individual's decisions from context, which
includes the influence of groups and the society of which the individual is
argue that "objective" assent to terms at formation is also a social construction, just a
different one. See Part IIB, infra. Referring to consent in the sense of conscious assent at the
outset, Linzer is rightly "unbowed in [his] skepticism about the centrality of consent in many
transactions that we deal with in contract law," although he adds, "This is not to say that
consent is irrelevant." Linzer, Consent, supra, at 213, 213 n.l.
30. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 8, at 307.
31. Farnsworth wrote:
The urge to have a 'theory' of contract law has tended to increase the distance
between contracts scholarship and practice. In particular, it has led to an excessive
emphasis by scholars on why promises are enforced.
Farnsworth, A Fable andA Quiz on Contracts, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 206, 208 (1987). Farnsworth
follows that statement with a quote from Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 8, showing
Barnett's focus on the grounds for enforcement: "Contract theory at present ... does not
provide a satisfactory answer to [the] question ... which interpersonal commitments the law
ought to enforce." Id.
See Craswell, Contract Law, Defaults Rules and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MIcn.
L. P~v. 489, 529 (1989) (observing that much of the current philosophical debate about the
binding force of promises is simply irrelevant to contract law's choice of background rules).
32. Even on the question of manifestation of consent to some sort of obligation, full
party control is not possible because the objective test calls for external evaluation of the
parties' words and actions by a legal decisionmaker, a process which inevitably imports social
control. Part IIB discusses this point more fully.
33. See Barnett, Agency Law, supra note 17, at 1979.
34. Id. at 1986-87, n.71.
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a member. 5 But individuals internalize social norms and experience them
to a significant extent as their own values. 36 On the other hand, individuals
experience all of their decisions and actions as constrained by social context
to some degree. There is no such thing as absolute autonomy, so we need
not worry about losing it (about dreaded "crossings" of our "boundaries" 3 7).
Individuality itself is a social construction fostered by many institutions,
including contract.
3 8
B. Posnerian Contract Theory
In contrast to Barnett's initial attempt to explain contract in terms of
express consent and conscious individual control, Richard Posner describes
as consensual every legal principle or decision that serves a goal of wealth
maximization. 9 His theory thus considers tort law as well as contract law
35. Barnett's consent theory derives from a conception of a primal scene of solitary
existence:
From the moment individuals live in close enough proximity to one another to
compete for the use of scarce natural resources, some way of allocating those
resources must be found.
Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 8, at 294, The trouble with this story is that individuals
never have lived apart from a social group. The individual only exists within groups and a
social context (even during occasional separations such as Robinson Crusoe's), and the
individual's choices can only be understood in this context.
36. See A. ETrzONI, supra note 13, at 5, 45-48.
37. R. NozicK, supra note 16, at 58. Nozick adds: "Voluntary consent opens the border
for crossings." Id. Barnett also thinks of rights as defining boundaries. See Barnett, Consent
Theory, supra note 8, at 301, 303.
38. Barnett's focus on individual freedom is in keeping with a long practice of ignoring
the implications of the fact that most contracts involve an organization on one or both sides.
See Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 733 n.63
(1931) (referring to our "vicious heritage of regularly viewing 'parties' to a deal as single
individuals.") It is beyond the scope of this article to tackle the "daunting task" of developing
a jurisprudence of organizations and then applying it to contract. See Stewart, Book Review,
Organizational Jurisprudence, 101 HARv. L. REv. 371, 375 (1986) (reviewing M. DAN-COHEN,
RIGHTs, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BuREAUCRAT SocsEry (1986),
which makes the points that organizations do not have "autonomy rights," except derivatively,
but do have "utilitarian rights"). I have addressed some implications of organizational consent
to contract in Part IIC, infra.
39. Posner considers consensual the results of hypothetical markets, constructed by
theorists who "guess people's market preferences" in situations, such as accidents, where
stopping to bargain is not possible. See Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 129-30 (1979) [hereinafter Utilitarianism]; Posner, The Ethical and
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, in LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND PHIOsOPHY 81, 85-91 (Kuperberg & Beitz, ed. 1983) (reprinted from 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
487 (1980)) [hereinafter Ethical Basis]. Posner uses the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency,
that a move is efficient if it increases total value (measured by willingness-including ability-
to pay), even though some individuals have less value after the move. Id. at 82-85. Posner's
argument that wealth maximization is based on implied general consent depends on the
debatable assumption that if parties could stop and bargain they would seek only to maximize
wealth and would not sacrifice this goal sometimes in favor of others. This assumption is
designed to make efficiency the only appropriate social policy goal.
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consensual to the extent tort or contract law serves the goal of wealth
maximization. Posner's particular law and economics version of consent is
admittedly fictitious in the sense of being based on putative general desires,
not necessarily those of the parties. 40 Stretching the concept of consent in
this way is reminiscent of attempts to stretch promise to explain all of
contract. For example, one could substitute "consenting" and "consents"
for "promising" and "promises" in this passage from an essay by Patrick
Atiyah (and thus produce a good critique of Posner's view of consent):
Is it meaningful or useful to claim that a person who boards a bus
is promising [consenting] to pay his fare? If so, would it not be
just as meaningful to say that when he descends from the bus and
crosses the road he promises [consents] to cross with all due care
for the safety of other road users?
4'
Neither promise nor consent fully explains contractual obligation-or civil
obligation generally. It does not improve the explanatory power of these
concepts to attempt to hide their limits with a fiction.
Like all fictions, Posner's version of consent masks a social policy
choice. Under Posner's theory, a social policy choice is presented as an
assumption about human nature (the assumption being that wealth-maxi-
mization-and nothing else-is what most people would choose if they could
stop and bargain over every social interaction). This account denies human
desires for fairness, decency, trust, cooperation and the like. That people
seem to act upon such desires-unless all of human nature is reductively
defined as self-interested-has been verified empirically.42 Posner's use of
the language of consent is an attempt to appeal to libertarians. This ploy
seems to have worked. For example, Barnett has moved to a recognition
that consent must at least in part be based on presumptions about general
desires .
43
It is no surprise that Barnett adopted an event model of consent, given
his wish to have contractual obligation individually controlled from the
40. See Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 39, at 88-89.
41. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations in EssAYS ON CONTRACT 19
(P. Atiyah ed. 1986). (Cohen, supra note 3, at 85, used a similar hypothetical.) Atiyah argues
that contract obligation is better explained by conduct, benefit, and reliance than by "promise."
Atiyah, supra, at 19.
All civil obligation, including contract and tort law, could be explained in terms of
consent, or all in terms of "duty," if these concepts are stretched, but in the process the
concepts lose their power to distinguish. "Consent" and "duty" are both social constructions.
See Linzer, Uncontracts, supra note 12, at 142; see also Feinman, The Jurisprudence of
Classification, 41 STAN. L. Ray. 661, 700-04 (1989) (discussing overlapping paradigms of
contract and tort).
42. For a compilation of empirical studies supporting the proposition that people act
upon these sorts of desires, see A. Erzioms, supra note 13, at 51-66. Two examples of this
sort of behavior are: people on out-of-town trips leave tips at restaurants they do not expect
ever to revisit, and people return apparently lost wallets to strangers, with cash untouched.
Id. at 51-52.
43. See Barnett, Agency Law, supra note 17, at 1986-87 n.71.
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outset to protect parties from each other. Slightly less self-evident is the
reason for Posner's adoption of an event model of consent, occuring at the
outset of a transaction. 44 If consent is fictitious, it is particularly easy to
see that it need not be conceived of as an event. Posner's use of the event
model is not mysterious, however; it serves his constrained views of human
nature and proper public policy. It is also consistent with the standard
neoclassical economic view of contracts as exchanges rather than relations.
Posner believes validity doctrines should be narrowly construed to
preserve liberty of contract, 45 ignoring that this assertion begs the question
what conditions are necessary for liberty. On entitlements, he argues that
the wealth maximization principle "ordains the creation of a system of
exclusive rights," but on the question of how to assign rights, he can do
no better than to propose using intuitions about "who is likely to value
them the most."" Posner's assumption that generally people want only
wealth maximization in their interactions results in a unitary approach to
both interpretation and questions of supplying terms. The approach calls
for legal decisionmakers to interpret or supply terms to maximize wealth.
In addition to the objection that wealth maximization is not and should
not be the sole goal of contract law, Posner's approach is problematic
because of the difficulties involved in defining and measuring costs. What
costs count can be controversial. The Coasean idea of "joint costs," or
costs caused by conflicting activities, raises issues concerning the definition
of costs. 47 In addition, it is not a simple matter to anticipate or to measure
all of the effects of legal rules over the short and long run. A legal rule
that seems to be inefficient in the short run may help to mold values,
resulting in long-term changes in the efficiency equation.41 Undercutting
norms of trust and cooperation may increase transaction costs over the long
44. For example, he says, "The notion of consent used here is what economists call ex
ante compensation." Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 39, at 86. "Ex ante" literally means
"from before," and refers to expectations at the outset.
45. See Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 39, at 134, 138.
46. Id. at 125. For critiques of the circularity of wealth maximization as a way to assign
entitlements, see Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the
Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U.L. REv. 349, 378-79 (1988) [hereinafter Defining Unfair-
ness]; Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFsTRA L Rnv. 509, 524-26
(1980).
If we are going to use intuitions to assign entitlements, a powerful intuition is that
redistribution will increase social welfare because the poor will value entitlements more than
the already glutted rich. Posner's system rejects this approach by definition; value is defined
in terms of willingness to pay under the existing distribution of resources. Utilitarianism, supra
note 39, at 119.
47. See Braucher, Toward A Broader Perspective on the Role of Economics in Legal
Policy Analysis. A Retrospective and an Agenda from Albert 0. Hirschman, 13 LAw & Soc.
INQURmy 741, 770 (1988); D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?,
43 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 513, 514-519, 530-536 (1989).
48. See Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference
Shaping Policy, 1990 DuE L. J. 1.
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term49 and may immediately impose "costs" in the form of moral and
aesthetic distress.
50
C. Relational Contract Theory
A relational approach to contract is highly attuned to context and norms
as the basis of obligation. Ian Macneil, the primary relational theorist,5'
developed the relational paradigm of contracts in response to the inadequa-
cies of a paradigm of contracts as discrete transactions. Macneil recognized
that the two paradigms of contract can coexist, although even the most
discrete transactions are to some extent relational, in that they are embedded
in social context.52 Macneil's argument is that we have been "brainwashed"
into conceiving of contracts as discrete transactions, thus misunderstanding
relational contract, which is actually the paradigm."
Drawing upon Macneil's work relational approach, one can conceptu-
alize consent either as a discrete event or as a continuing process.5 4 The
event model of consent, which coincides with an exchange paradigm of
contract, freezes the content of obligation at the outset. In its more literal-
minded version, the event model of consent envisions that parties articulate
their intentions in detail at the outset and make elaborate provisions for
49. Even Posner states that "convential pieties" such as keeping promises and telling
the truth reduce transaction costs. Utilitarianism, supra note 39, at 123. Posner appears to
believe, however, that markets sustain the necessary level of these pieties. Albert Hirschman
has made a more sweeping point that nonmarket institutions and values are a necessary part
of the background for successful markets, and that markets would undermine themselves if
not checked by nonmarket values. See A. Hiscm&At, RvAL Vmws OF NLMAET SocIETY AND
OTHER REcENT EssAYs 115, 139 (1986).
50. The lesson of Coase is that we cannot say which of two conflicting activities imposes
a cost on the other. If moral or aesthetic enjoyment of the absence of an activity or way of
thinking counts as an activity, then nearly any activity or way of thinking can be seen as
producing joint costs. See Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of
Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 Wis. L. Rnv. 919, 954.
51. See, e.g., I. MAcNam, THE NEw SOCIAL CoNTncr (1980); Macneil, Adjustment,
supra note 14; Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L.
Rav. 483 [hereinafter Relational Contract].
52. See Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 14, at 856-59. In contrast to Barnett's primal
scene of solitary existence, see note 35, supra, Macneil wrote:
In the beginning was society. And ever since has been society. This surely must be
the most forgotten fact in the modem study of contracts, whether in law or in
economics. This lapse of memory we deliberately impose on ourselves in both
disciplines by our heroin-like addiction to discrete transactions.
1. MACNEIL, supra note 51, at 1.
53. Macneil, Relational Contract, supra note 51, at 485-93.
54. Consent is ideally conceived of as a continuing process in the law and social practice
of informed consent to medical treatment. See Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal
and Policy Analysis of the Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv.
777, 830 (1982). In medical treatment, however, the usual understanding is that the patient is
not bound to future stages of treatment; the relationship and the treatment evolve, and the
patient can revoke consent at any time. Id. In contrast, conventionally the law treats consent
to contract as irrevocable by unilateral action, unless the power to revoke is reserved specifically.
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contingencies. If parties later change aspects of their bargain, an eventuality
conceived of as unusual, the event model expects that a new formal
articulation will occur.
The literal version of the event model of consent works best if the
contract is very simple: For example, buyer agrees to pay $400 for a 10-
year-old clunker described not as a car but as a "heap of junk," and seller
agrees to deliver it tomorrow. 5 But it turns out the literal, event model of
consent does not work very well even here. Many details and effects of
contingencies have not been spelled out. For example, assume the parties
never mentioned hubcaps or brakes. Is there any liability, and, if so, how
much, when the heap of junk is delivered without hubcaps and without
brakes? Suddenly the hypothetical is much too sparse; we need to know all
we can find out about the parties and their dealings, for example: Did the
parties have dealings before? Did the buyer inspect? What was his purpose
in buying? Did the seller know of this purpose? Were the parties both
consumers or both merchants, or one of each? What questions did each
party ask the other? What was disclosed? The full context is relevant to
the dispute that has arisen. In addition, the significance of each element of
context depends on social norms.
If the contract is more complicated and calls for performance over a
period of time (e.g., a working capital loan agreement, with periodic
extensions of credit), the event model becomes yet more unrealistic. Not
only do the parties inevitably fail to address many matters at the outset,
but the context that fills in their agreement extends over a period of time.
Norms may evolve in the particular relation.
The process model of consent coincides with a relational paradigm of
contract. In this approach, either the contractual relation is loosely defined,
and it evolves (e.g., employment), or, if the relation is more structured
(e.g., long-term supply contract for materials used in manufacturing), the
parties are likely to realize at the outset that they cannot anticipate many
contingencies, and they may create a framework for future decision-making.
Alternatively, they may start with a detailed contract document, but then
cooperate and adjust their relations without having provided a framework
for doing so in advance.
A flexible view of contract formation and contract interpretation, in-
corporating the ideas of consent as a continuing process and contract as
relation, opens up the possibility of finding the content of obligations in
the norms of cooperation and fairness reflected in a contractual relationship
and its social context. This relational, process version of consent can go
.beyond wealth maximization and serve values Posner wishes to eliminate
from the public policy of the common law. It is based on the emerging
socio-economic challenge to the neo-classical economic paradigm of human
55. See Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 14, at 857. Macneil uses a more extreme
example of discreteness, a cash purchase of gasoline on a turnpike by someone rarely traveling
the road.
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nature. This new paradigm assumes a tension and balance between the
individual and the community as well as a moral dimension to utility (that
is, that people are motivated by pleasure and by morality).56 Thus, at a
minimum, conceiving of consent as a process and contract as relation means
the content of obligation depends on social context and is tied less to
definition at the outset; beyond that, as will be seen, this relational con-
ception of contracts provides a theoretical foundation for the argument that
the law of contract should serve other values in addition to wealth maxi-
mization.
The implications of relational theory for questions of validity of consent
(and for questions about the effect of entitlements on validity) are dramatic;
the theory calls for issues of mutuality and power to be addressed throughout
the relation.17 Macneil wrote:
When we turn to relational contract law, any distinction between a
status quo before exchange and the situation following projection
of exchange into the future tends to become virtually meaningless.
Relations involve a flow of exchanges, or many flows at the same
time, occurring in complex patterns not lending themselves to di-
vision into discrete periods. It follows that relational contract law
must, if it is to concern itself at all with mutuality and power, deal
with those issues, before, during and after exchanges.
5 8
In a relational approach to contract, interpretation and supplying terms
both require investigation of the norms of the relationship and of the social
context. Some difficulty is caused by the fact that the effort to observe
relational norms occurs after the relation has broken down and the process
of consent has come to a halt. Even relying on the state of the relationship
before the breakdown, a relational approach to interpretation and supplying
terms cannot depend entirely upon consent, except in a fictitious sense of
consent. The creation of the relation is likely to have been conscious and
even express, and the creation of its norms over time also may have been
conscious and express to some extent. But an outsider must declare what
the operative norms are in the event of a dispute. The relational approach,
however, recognizes that individual control can only be relative, not abso-
lute, so that external definition of obligation is seen as pervasive. The policy
choice to look at relational norms when interpreting contracts or supplying
terms relies upon a view that private ordering can occur only in a context.
It recognizes the interplay of contractual relations with community stan-
dards.
56. See A. Earziom, supra note 13, at 21 (stating that there are "at least two irreducible
sources of valuation or 'utility': pleasure and morality"). See also id. at 8-13.
57. See I. MAcNEi, supra note 51, at 86.
58. Id. Macneil hastened to add the caveat that where discreteness and presentiation
(dealing with the future in the present) are valued in a contractual relation, then use of discrete
legal principles is appropriate. Id.
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Can consent as a process work in practice? This approach may be
difficult for some to accept because abandoning the event model of consent
means giving up the illusion of party control, achieved by full definition of
obligation at the outset. Even so, accepting the concept of consent as a
process forces greater candor; denial and evasion will not make the regu-
latory content of contract law go away. Contract law is regulatory even
when it clings to the event model of consent, for example in traditional
formation doctrine,59 and to the exchange paradigm of contracts.
Relational theory, like any contract theory, must go beyond a rationale
of express, conscious consent. This theory calls for legal decisionmakers to
attempt to discover and apply norms from the parties' pre-breakdown
relationship as well as from the broader social context in order to answer
questions about validity of consent, interpretation and supplying terms.
II. THE NORMATIV DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT LAW
Enforcement of contractual obligation requires external normative def-
inition-that is, regulation. This regulation has three dimensions. First,
determining the validity of consent requires elaborate normative judgments.
A related question is the appropriate limits of consent as a rationale for
contract enforcement, particularly for enforcement of very harsh terms. The
second normative dimension of contract law stems from the necessity that
contracts be interpreted; courts must interpret to determine the creation and
the content of obligation, and interpretation unavoidably involves normative
choices about when obligation should arise and what its content should be.
Finally, parties are inevitably silent on many matters, and interpretation
thus shades over into supplying terms, a process that constrains and in
some cases replaces party control. The three subsections that follow, ad-
dressing these issues of validity, interpretation, and supplying terms, explain
why external normative definition is essential in each of these dimensions.
Additionally, these subsections explore what are the particular normative
choices reflected in current American contract law. The regulatory role of
contract law is played out in the three normative dimensions.
A. Validity of Consent and the Limits of Consent
1. Differentials in Wealth, Power, Knowledge, and Judgment
"Consent" occurs in the context of a prior distribution of entitlements
and abilities. Interrelated elements of wealth, power, knowledge, and judg-
59. In its most rigid, stylized form, the law of formation has elaborate normative content;
this body of doctrine attempts to protect parties from each other and from themselves and
expects parties to look out for each other as well as for themselves. See, e.g., Fuller, supra
note 11 (discussing functions of legal formalities in general and consideration in particular).
For example, the cautionary function recognizes that formalities protect parties from inconsid-
erate commitment. Barnett ignores the cautionary function in his defense of enforcement of
informal promises without consideration. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 8, at 310-
17.
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ment of the parties constitute the conditions in which they make choices or
undertake relationships. Choices, relations, entitlements, and abilities cannot
be separated. A focus on "consent" in the context of the conditions of the
status quo suggests that these conditions are a legitimate basis for choice,
which is not necessarily so. Giving consent involves a relative judgment;
one consents to a change, not to the prior position or the resulting one.
Contract law must make judgments about validity of consent. The
parties cannot determine for themselves what constitutes valid consent. If
that were so, a man with a gun to his head and his assailant could decide
that physical duress does not affect validity of consent. Validity depends
on external normative choices. In an imperfect world, where the distribution
of entitlements is unjust and where traits and abilities vary dramatically,
consent is at best a relative justification for contract enforcement, not an
absolute one. Contract law must draw lines concerning when the circum-
stances make consent "valid."' 0 Arguably, it is redundant to speak of "valid
consent;" invalid consent is not consent. Yet there are many common
expressions about consent that refer to conditions necessary to validity:
voluntary consent, informed consent, consenting adults. These expressions
recognize that the significance of acts and words of apparent consent may
be undercut by circumstances as well as by characteristics of the one
consenting.
Legal categories that deal with the problem of validity of apparent
consent include duress and undue influence, misrepresentation (or fraud),
mistake, incapacity, and unconscionability. 61 Unconscionability can be un-
derstood as a residual invalidity category that picks up cases of quasi-duress
and quasi-fraud 62 and of limited capacity as well as combinations of various
borderline validity problems. These legal categories refer to problems of
power (duress),63 knowledge (fraud and mistake), and judgment (incapacity)
64
and to elements and combinations of these three problems (undue influence,
unconscionability). Translating the invalidity categories in this way empha-
sizes their malleability and expandability. How much power, knowledge,
60. Sandel has observed:
Rawls emphasizes that, notwithstanding their voluntary dimension, our actual obli-
gations are never born of consent alone but inevitably presuppose an antecedent
background morality ....
M. SANDEL, supra note 14, at 110. Sandel makes the point that the mere fact of agreement is
not the test of its fairness. Id. at 109.
61. Eisenberg says these doctrines deal with "quality" of consent. Eisenberg, The Bargain
Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 741, 742 (1982). Although this terminology makes
sense logically, consent is generally taken to be an on/off matter in contract law, which is a
reason to use the word "validity.
62. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 485, 487-88 (1967) [hereinafter, Unconscionability].
63. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253
(1947).
64. See Meiklejohn, Contractual and Donative Capacity, 39 CAsa W. REs. L. REv. 307
(1988-89).
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and judgment are necessary to make consent valid? Each of the categories
calls for normative refinement in application. 6
5
Contract doctrine has not explicitly addressed wealth imbalances as a
separate validity category, although wealth is often a factor in the validity
doctrines or in particular contract rules. Contract law's failure to embrace
redistribution as a core goal can be justified on the grounds that contract
cannot do this job well. Contract law rules are often a crude, temporary,
and puny means of redistribution." For example, a contract rule that
redistributes wealth from landlords to tenants is crude because it does not
help the homeless or affect wealthy non-landlords, while it does affect
relatively poor as well as rich landlords. Furthermore, this sort of rule is
temporary in that increased costs of a rule frequently can be passed along
(to the tenants), or investments can be shifted to avoid the costs of the
rule. Finally, given the extremes of wealth and poverty in our society,
contract rules are a small, slow way to achieve redistribution. Taxes and
transfer payments are a better way to maintain a pattern of distributive
justice.67
Using taxes and transfer payments as the central method of redistri-
bution answers one critique of a patterned conception of justice, that it
requires constant interference in people's transactions.68 A transition problem
remains for those who believe in the importance of equity in the pattern
of distribution: It is hard to tolerate, at a minimum, extreme contractual
advantage-taking by those rich in entitlements in their dealings with the
relatively poor, so long as we fail to redistribute sufficiently through taxes
and transfer payments. This is a reason for contract law to take wealth
disparities into account.
What is at stake in the validity doctrines of contract law is defining the
conditions necessary to freedom. Attempting to do so raises deep value
conflicts. At one extreme, libertarians want very minimal conditions because
they fear that freedom will be limited in the name of fostering it. Libertarians
conceive of freedom in negative terms, rather than in terms of creating
even minimum positive conditions to allow self-actualization.6 9 At the other
extreme, freedom could be defined in terms of substantively fair distribution,
because of fear that unequal distribution of wealth and other advantages
65. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, CoNRACTS 262 (1982) (describing law of duress and
stating: "Judges have been caught up in making moral judgments of the most delicate sort
66. See Braucher, Defining Unfairness, supra note 46, at 383-84 (discussing ineffectiveness
of contract law as means of redistribution).
67. See supra note 23 (concerning Nozick's description of "patterned" distributive justice,
versus historical basis for justice in distribution).
68. See Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 475 (1980).
69. Nozick defines voluntariness in terms of absence of coercion, with coercion defined
in terms of negative rights (not to be harmed). See R. NozIcK, supra note 16, at 262; see also
Nozick, Coercion, in PmLosoPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD: EsSAYs IN HONOR OF ErNEsT NAGEL
440 (S. Morgenbess ed. 1969).
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at the outset of any supposedly free process makes the process merely a
way for the advantaged to increase their advantages. 0 While one extreme
tends to mean freedom for the rich, powerful, informed, and shrewd at the
expense of the poor, weak, ignorant, and naive, the other threatens the
idea of some role for individual choice. These extremes coincide with
Nozick's two categories of justice-a historical basis (and process orienta-
tion), as opposed to a time-slice, "patterned" conception. 7'
Invalidity doctrines in contract law, a compromise of these distributive
and process conceptions of justice, have historically been more responsive
to the libertarian end of the spectrum of opinion, sharply limiting the
situations in which apparent consent could successfully be challenged. Ini-
tially, for example, duress only invalidated "apparent" consent in cases of
physical assault, physical imprisonment or threats of serious bodily harm. 72
Gradually, the doctrine of duress expanded to cover economic pressure,7 3
and the law was forced to acknowledge and struggle with the inevitable
relativity of the idea of duress.74
The invalidity categories have expanded, but a great constraint on
expansion of legally recognized conditions for free contractual choice re-
mains. This is the bifurcation of the question of consent into apparent
consent and validity. Rather than looking at the total context in which
consent has supposedly been given (which would be a more relational
approach), the law of contract has asked, first, are there words or acts of
consent ("objectively" judged)? If so, then the one who apparently con-
sented must prove that he or she did not validly do so. Where there are
words or acts of consent, this bifurcated analysis tips the balance in favor
of validation of questionable consent.7 5 One could ask, in what sense was
there an "appearance" of consent where the promisee extracted consent to
a contract with a threat of physical harm? Surely there was no appearance
70. See Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563,
582 (1982).
71. See R. NoZICK, supra note 16, at 152-64. See also M. SANDEL, supra note 14, at
106-09.
72. See Dawson, supra note 63, at 254.
73. See id. at 255.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS §§ 175, 176 (1979) (stating law of duress
in terms of whether threat was "improper" and whether threat left promisor with "reasonable"
alternative).
75. See Lewis v. Lewis, 387 So. 2d 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding post-separation
community property settlement against wife's duress challenge and reversing trial court's
nullification of settlement). The wife testified that her husband had threatened that she would
be "taken care of" if she did not sign the property settlement. Id. at 1207. She also claimed
she had been beaten in the past, and the appellate court conceded, "A meager amount of
evidence indicated some physical cruelty was involved" in the separation on the grounds of
cruel treatment. Id. at 1210. The couple's son was living with the husband. Id. at 1207. There
were two other witnesses to threats, but the judge discounted them as follows: "[T]he same
two witnesses admitted either that the threats were not made in connection with the community
property settlement or that the threats were made during a normal husband-wife argument in
the presence of other persons." Id. at 1210.
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of valid consent to the promisee who made the threat. The same can be
said of a promisee who drafts a harsh term into paragraph 25 of the tiny
print in a form contract used in a consumer transaction; in what sense is
the drafter-promisee misled by an appearance of consent to that term on
the part of the consumer? Yet in both cases, the "apparent" promisor has
to raise and prove lack of valid consent.
The concern in the bifurcated approach seems not to be with reasonable
reliance by the promisee, but rather with cooked-up validity challenges
threatening security of transactions. The bifurcated analysis and allocation
of burden of proof to the promisor in validity challenges also seem designed
to restrict the juristic dispensing power to let people out of bad bargains.
The policy choice has been to favor security of transactions over concern
for validity of consent. Often, this approach is unfair. (One might even
argue that limited validity analysis is inefficient to the extent that contract
enforcement in a context of invalid consent exceeds prevention of manu-
factured validity challenges; this argument, however, only demonstrates the
circularity of efficiency analysis on distribution questions-in this case,
questions about how much information, judgment and power are necessary
for valid choice.) Validity analysis has used a narrow focus on an event of
consent, with minimal, constrained attention to social context, sometimes
viewed as a suspect basis for questioning obligation.
A recurrent debate in the law of validity of contractual consent is
whether to examine the process by which consent is achieved, the substance
of the resulting contract, or both.7 6 The difficulty of defining improper
process led to greater attention to substantive fairness, but the difficulty of
defining fair substance led back to a focus on procedural fairness. Neither
focus works, procedurally or substantively, to avoid the difficult normative
choices involved in determining validity of consent. Procedurally, the prob-
lem is that it is as difficult to define fair procedure as to define fair results.
Substantively, an exclusive focus on "fair" process leads to an apology for
oppressive results flowing from prior imbalances in traits and wealth.
Requiring every promisee to prove "fair" substance, however, would threaten
the very idea of individual choice and increase unpridictability about the
enforceability of contracts. Difficult value choices about the conditions
necessary for valid consent are inescapable. Looking at both procedure and
substance to develop a compromise approach to making these choices seems
to be the best the law can do.
2. Consent to Oppression
A question related to validity is: what are the limits of consent as a
76. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 63, at 282-88 (arguing that unfairness of resulting
exchange was factor usually overlooked in analysis of law of duress); Leff, Unconscionability,
supra note 62 (discussing substantive and procedural unconscionability); Eisenberg, supra note
61, at 754 (pointing out that it is difficult and unproductive to classify cases as involving
procedural as opposed to substantive unconscionability, and calling for specification of norms
based on transaction types).
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justification for oppressive results? The law prohibits some terms and makes
others unenforceable (and makes some mandatory), in part because of the
impossibility of designing procedures adequate to make consent valid; to
avoid impositions by one party on another, the law withholds enforcement,
prohibits some terms, and requires others. Oppressiveness as a reason to
require, to prohibit or not to enforce a contract term is in part based on
invalidity of consent and in part goes beyond a rationale of lack of consent.
The law prohibits or makes unenforceable certain harsh terms and
contracts because of doubt that they can be validly entered into; the
suspicion is that only knowledge, power and judgment problems (often
combined with lack of wealth) could produce them. The harshness of the
terms is evidence of validity problems. In addition, widespread regret over
certain sorts of contracts casts doubt on the validity of consent.
7
In most, and arguably all, cases where indecency of a term or contract
might be used as a ground for denying enforcement, the conditions sur-
rounding apparent consent are dubious, so that the validity and oppressive-
ness rationales can be understood as complementary. Take the example of
In the Matter of Baby M.78 Although rejected in the trial court and not
addressed by the Supreme Court, there were plausible fraud7 9 and
77. Certain contracts are made unenforceable because of the high likelihood of regret.
See Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE
L.J. 1261, 1281, 1321-22 (1980) (risk of regret sometimes makes nonenforcement optimal).
Contracts increase welfare only if expectations concerning gains are not biased systematically.
When many people who enter into a given sort of contract end up regretting making the
contract, then that sort of contract is not welfare-enhancing. Under economic assumptions
that people choose what they want, the presence of widespread regret casts doubt on the
conditions in which the choices were made. For other explanations of significant regret, see
West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REv. 867 (1988)
(arguing that economic assumptions about human nature are wrong, in that people do not
always know what is best for them and are not always motivated to seek what they cognitively
know is best for them); Hirschman, Against Parsimony, in A. HiscHmAN, supra note 49, at
142-59 (stating that economic assumptions about human nature are oversimplified and that
economics has neglected reflective value changes, possibility of noninstrumental action, and
effects of morality, civic spirit and trust).
78. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
79. The contract provided: "The sole purpose of this Agreement is to enable WILLIAM
STERN and his infertile wife to have a child which is biologically related to WILLIAM
STERN." 109 N.J. at 470, 537 A.2d at 1265. Mary Beth Whitehead was not told that Elizabeth
Stem did not try to become pregnant for fear of exacerbating multiple sclerosis. 217 N.J.
Super. 313, 379, 525 A.2d 1128, 1161 (1987). The trial court construed "infertile" not to
mean literal inability to conceive, 217 N.J. Super. at 380, 525 A.2d at 1161, and determined
that the omission of information concerning Dr. Stem's multiple sclerosis was not material.
217 N.J. Super. at 384, 525 A.2d at 1162, 1163. In addition, Mrs. Whitehead underwent a
psychological evaluation and was told that she "passed." 109 N.J. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1247.
An agency recommended her as a surrogate even though the evaluator said it would be
important to explore with her in more depth whether she would be able to relinquish the child
and noted Mrs. Whitehead had a tendency to deny her feelings. 217 N.J. Super. at 343, 382,
525 A.2d at 1142, 1162. This basis for fraud was rejected when asserted against the Stems on
the grounds that the infertility center that conducted the evaluation was not proved to be the
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unconscionability ° arguments against enforcing the contract. Furthermore,
as to surrogacy contracts generally, there is evidence of judgment-related
problems in a disproportionate number of women who seek to act as
surrogate mothers; for example, many of them consciously or unconsciously
use surrogacy as a way to attempt to deal with unresolved feelings associated
with prior losses of fetuses in abortions and prior losses of children through
relinquishment for adoption." In addition, there seems to be a high risk of
misunderstanding between the parties about the nature of the "deal"; the
mother usually thinks, and is encouraged by those who promote surrogacy
to think, of herself not merely as providing a paid service, but as giving a
great gift, which merits abiding respect and gratitude, while the father and
his wife often come to want her eliminated from their and the baby's
consciousness, and they consider payment of money to settle their debt.1
2
Stems' agent. 217 N.J. Super. at 383, 525 A.2d at 1163. The Supreme Court did not address
the fraud issue, holding the contract unenforceable as against public policy. 109 N.J. at 411,
537 A.2d at 1234.
80. Substantively, the argument was that $10,000 was too low a price in view of the
efforts and risks on the part of the surrogate. 217 N.J. Super. at 377, 525 A.2d at 1160.
Procedurally, there were the information problems that also formed the basis of the fraud
argument. See supra note 79. Additionally, the Whiteheads had no lawyer when they entered
into the contract with the Stems. 217 N.J. Super. at 378, 525 A.2d at 1160. The lawyer who
reviewed a similar contract document with them in connection with Mrs. Whitehead's work
with another couple (not the Stems) was under contract with the infertility center to act as
counsel for surrogate candidates, a fact the Whiteheads used to suggest that the lawyer was
not fully dedicated to their interests. 109 N.J. Super. at 436, 537 A.2d at 1247.
81. See Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J. PsYcH.
117, 118 (1983). In a sample of 125 women who applied to be surrogates, 44 had either had
an abortion or had relinquished a child for adoption. Parker wrote:
Some women believed these previous losses would help them to control and
minimize any depressive feelings they might have in response to relinquishing the
baby. A few consciously felt that they were participating in order to deal with
unresolved feelings associated with their prior losses.
Id. at 118. Here are two chilling anecdotes from Parker's study:
The only applicant who had been adopted had been 'forced' at age 14 to
relinquish her baby, and she wanted to repeat the experience of relinquishment and
master it. One applicant who had had an abortion said that instead of 'killing a
baby' she wanted to give the gift of a live baby to a loving couple who wanted to
have and raise a child.
Id. In an unusual departure from a priori argument, Richard Posner has called for empirical
research concerning regret in surrogacy contracts. See Posner, The Ethics and Economics of
Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. oF CoNTEMp. HEALTH L & PoL'y 21, 28-
29 (1989). Empirical research will not resolve the question, of course. How many women
attempting to work through guilt over earlier abortions and adoptions do we need to offset
the joy of would-be parents of the surrogates' children?
82. There is ample evidence of this sort of phenomenology in various accounts of
surrogacy. See P. CHESLER, SACRED BoND-THE LEGACY OF BAsy M (1988); KEANE & BRao,
TIE SuRooATm MOTHER (1981); M.B. WHIrEHEAD & P. ScHwARTz-NoBEL, A MOTHMR'S
STORY: Ti TRUTH ABOUT THE BABY M CASE (1989).
There are other reasons to oppose enforceability of surrogacy contracts, such as the
arguments that they commodify women's reproductive capacity and children themselves. See
infra text accompanying notes 97-102. There are objectional third-party effects, such as the
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The mother is cheated when she does not get the esteem she was encouraged
to expect.
Oppressiveness as a reason not to enforce a contract also goes beyond
a rationale of lack of valid consent. Denying enforcement of oppressive
terms is based on respect for an underlying value that consent is thought
to serve-freedom. Whether contracts are conceived of as exchanges or as
relations, the point is to restrict future freedom to some extent,83 so it only
makes sense to talk of "freedom of contract" as referring to the freedom
to get the advantages of restricting one's future freedom. Where someone
else will pay for a restriction on future freedom, it can be considered an
"an opportunity. ' 84 Yet there is a stock qualification-that we refuse to
take this reasoning to the extreme of allowing a person to sell herself into
slavery.
There are very few modern instances of people selling themselves into
slavery, so the widespread use of this hypothetical, in addition to its
pedigree,"5 seems due to where it leads. The next question, almost inevitably,
is: what is sufficiently "like" slavery also to be impermissible in the name
of consent and freedom? 6 One can attempt to account for limits on consent
as a justification for enforceability by creating the category of "inalienable
rights" 87 or, more precisely, "market inalienability." 8 But the language of
inalienable rights89 tends to suggest that consent is a sufficient rationale for
enforceability except in the most dire, extreme sorts of cases. This is
argument by label. 90
impact on the previous children of a surrogate mother of having their mother give up their
half-sibling for adoption in exchange for a sum of money.
83. See Mensch, Book Review, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 SrA. L. REv. 753,
759 (1981) (stating that "fajll contracts are in restraint of trade").
84. The New Jersey Supreme Court in its opinion in In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J.
at 442, 537 A.2d at 1250, conceded that some women see surrogacy as "an opportunity."
85. J. Mu.L, On Liberty, in J. MILL & T. CAR.LYLE 311-12 (Harvard Classics ed. 1909).
For other uses of the self-enslavement example, see, e.g., Cohen, supra note 11, at 105;
Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 39, at 134; Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts,
92 YALE L.J. 763, 764 (1983).
86. Nozick, perhaps anticipating this move, says even slavery contracts and suicide
contracts should be permissible. See R. NozIcK, supra note 16, at 58. Posner also takes the
extreme position of defending slavery contracts. Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 39, at 134.
But see D. Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 179-81 (1989) (stating that
it is an embarrassment to consent theorists that consent theory could validate slavery); G.
ORwELL, 1984 7 (New American Library ed. 1949) (describing party slogan, "Freedom is
Slavery," on the facade of the Ministry of Truth).
Barnett concedes the illegitimacy of slavery contracts and the legitimacy of extension of
this idea by analogy, referring to "agreements amounting to slavery arrangements." Barnett,
Consent Theory, supra note 8, at 293; see also id. at 290.
87. Id. at 270, 291-94 (stating that contract theory must be situated in entitlements
theory, and that one can only contract away alienable, as opposed to inalienable, rights).
88. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HALv. L. Rav. 1849, 1854 (1987).
89. See Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1353 (1984) (discussing instability
and social contingency of rights).
90. A more ordinary label is to call some terms indecent-too harsh to be enforceable.
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Many sorts of deals or terms are currently unenforceable, or prohibited
by law. Denial of enforcement is a mild legal response to contracts consid-
ered socially undesirable; it means the law refuses to foster a market in
that sort of deal. Where promises restrict freedom in questionable ways,
refusal by the state to enforce them means that consent of the promisor
must be continuing (consent in the past is not enough). Keeping up good
relations then becomes the only way to get mutual advantages, since external
enforcement is unavailable.
Law can also respond more severely by making certain contracts or
terms a violation of a civil regulatory scheme, such as the Federal Trade
Commission's power over unfair practices91 or even a crime, such as the
criminal prohibition of price-fixing agreements under the Sherman Act. A
special case is the rule that contracts for personal services are not specifically
enforceable; the objection is not to the contract itself, but to enforcement
that makes a person a temporary slave.92
There are numerous examples of the law's response to contracts or
contract terms considered socially undesirable in themselves. A contract
term waiving the statutory right to discharge in bankruptcy is not enforce-
When the law prohibits or makes unenforceable certain terms or contracts, a rationale of
indecency is needed to supplement a market failure/cost-benefit analysis rationale, which is
based at least in part on lack of valid consent. For example, most consumers do not understand
complex contingent terms in credit contracts such as cross-collateralization or blanket security
interests and do not shop over them, so that consumers do not choose these terms; creditors
do, without market policing. Disclosure will not work because it is not possible to get consumers
to read and understand explanations of all sorts of complex contingent terms. The best way
to achieve efficiency is to prohibit the terms most consumers would not choose given a full
understanding of the terms. This rationale involves a recognition of failure of consent in actual
markets (consent is invalid because of a knowledge problem), and construction of hypothetical
consent through imagining choices under ideal market conditions (cost-benefit analysis). See
Braucher, Defining Unfairness, supra note 46, at 351-54, 417-29.
Left unexplained by the market failure/cost-benefit rationale is the restriction of choice
to the minority of consumers who would choose harsh terms, even if they understood them,
in order to get a benefit such as credit that is otherwise unavailable. Here an "indecency"
rationale can supplement the efficiency rationale. The only way to achieve most people's
choices under full information is by restricting a minority's choices, and in addition-the
indecency rationale goes-the minority is better off without credit that depends on giving the
creditor the right to take away all of their household goods on default.
I have never meant to suggest that the threat to take away all household goods does not
have leverage value to creditors in collection efforts or that actually taking away worthless
household goods from one debtor may be useful to creditors as a way to "encourage" other
debtors to pay "voluntarily." But the same arguments can be made for knee-breaking as a
remedy. Threats have value, but that fact does not end normative inquiry into their legitimacy.
See Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 CotUm. L. Rnv. 730,
777-78, n.158 (1989); compare Braucher, Defining Unfairness, supra note 46, at 428.
91. See, e.g., Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (1989) (prohibiting use of certain
terms in consumer credit contracts).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 comment a (1979) (referring to
undesirability of imposing "what may seem like involuntary servitude").
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able. 93 Wage assignments9 4 and blanket household goods security interests95
in consumer credit are not merely unenforceable, they are prohibited, with
the lender subject to civil sanction for putting these terms in a contract. It
is a crime to engage in loansharking, offering credit at very high interest
rates with implicit agreed remedies such as knee-breaking, or to offer sexual
services for money. Is it helpful, when drawing lines such as these, to think
in terms of "inalienable rights"? This sort of "rights talk" seems designed
to stop thought rather than to help get a feel for the limits the law should
put on prior consent as a rationale for current enforcement.9 6
In her examination of market inalienability, Margaret Jane Radin does
not present it as an easy on/off classification; rather, she explores com-
modification as a "continuum. ' 97 Radin justifies a pluralistic position that
recognizes a role for markets and for market-inalienability on the basis of
a positive conception of freedom, in which inalienabilities are freedom-
enhancing and not experienced as impositions of unwanted restraints on the
desire to transact in markets. 9 She sees market inalienability as a means to
foster a better view of personhood, one which recognizes context as integral
to individuality. 99 This sort of thinking can be the basis for gradual exten-
sion, reflecting societal norms, of realms where consent to contract is an
insufficient basis for enforcement, in order to foster freedom. From this
perspective, denial of enforcement of surrogacy contracts is an easy case.
The picture of the state forcibly removing a child from its mother, who is
now desperate to maintain the relationship and who feels the contract was
a terrible mistake, is the sort of melodrama of human suffering captured
in grand opera.1°°
93. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10) (1988) (providing that effective waiver of discharge can be
executed only after filing in bankruptcy, and that waiver requires court approval).
94. A wage assignment term gave a creditor power, without prior judgment or prior
notice and hearing and in some states without even default in payment, to notify the debtor's
employer and have the employer pay all or a percentage of the debtor's wages to the creditor.
See Credit Practices Rule, Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 49 Fed,
Reg. 7740, 7755 (1984). This type of term is now prohibited by the FTC's Credit Practices
Rule. See Credit Practices Rule, supra note 91.
95. These security interests gave the creditor the right to repossess household goods and
personal effects (even though not purchased with the credit given) upon default, through either
self-help repossession (if possible without breach of the peace) or summary proceedings. See
Credit Practices Rule, Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, supra note
94, at 7761. Nonpurchase-money, nonpossessory security interests in household goods are now
prohibited by the Credit Practices Rule. See Credit Practices Rule, supra note 91.
96. See Tushnet, supra note 89.
97. See Radin, supra note 88, at 1918.
98. Id. at 1899, 1903.04. See also Cohen, supra note 11, at 76-79 (discussing contract
law's tendency to emphasize negative conception of freedom).
99. See id. at 1903-05.
100. But see Shultz, Reproductive Technologies and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Op-
portunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 297, 365-66 (defending specific enforcement
of surrogacy contracts from a liberal perspective, despite harshness of enforcement). Shultz
argues that if surrogacy contracts are not enforced, the father suffers an analogous loss. The
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For a more arguable case, consider again the example of blanket
household goods security interests, which are not only made unenforceable,
but are prohibited by the Federal Tade Commission's Credit Practices Rule,
subjecting a creditor who puts such a term in a consumer contract to civil
sanction.' 0 If you think prohibiting these household goods security interests
is a good idea, it is probably not because we have inalienable rights to our
clothes, curtains, furniture, stereo equipment and assorted household clap-
trap. Rather, the appointments of a person's home have something to do
with identity, and giving a creditor the right to take everything away, or to
threaten to do so, gives terrible leverage, putting the debtor at the creditor's
mercy. There is some irony in the fact that this example invdlves a degree
of noncommodification in the name of personal identity based on com-
modities.'02 Losing your household possessions is not the same as losing
your child. But here again, the scene at the time of enforcement is potentially
melodramatic: To maintain the credibility of a creditor's threats, the cred-
itor's repo man hauls away largely unsalable used household goods, while
humiliated and anguished family members look blank or weep.
In sum, validity of consent and oppressiveness of the resulting deal are
related reasons to deny enforcement. Drawing validity lines involves deter-
mining how much wealth, power, knowledge and judgment are necessary
for an obligation arising from a contractual relation to be enforced against
a now unwilling party. Drawing validity lines thus involves defining the
conditions for freedom. In drawing these lines, it is helpful to look at both
the procedure by which the obligation supposedly came into being and its
substance. Rules denying enforcement of particular harsh terms and con-
tracts are based in part on doubts about validity of consent. The rationale
for these rules also goes beyond lack of consent, in order to serve the
underlying value of freedom. The rules refuse enforcement where a contract
places too great a restraint on freedom and puts a person too drastically in
another's control.
B. Interpretation
1. External Definition of Obligation and the 'Objective' Element in
Interpretation
The second normative dimension of contract arises from the fact that
interpretation is necessary to answer the questions whether a party has
goal of nonenforcement, however, is to discourage surrogacy contracts and to make clear that
no one should build expectations around state action to remove a child from one parent based
on a contract.
101. Credit Practices Rule, supra note 91. See also note 95, supra.
102. Radin calls regulation of the conditions of alienation "incomplete commodification."
Radin, supra note 88, at 1919. In the example in the text, a person may sell household goods
outright. Under the Credit Practices Rules, however, she may not give a security interest in
household goods unless the goods are purchased with the credit given for the security interest,
so household goods are incompletely commodified. See Credit Practices Rule, supra note 91.
Radin also distinguishes between personal things, such as homes, with which people
justifiably identify themselves, and improper object-relations, involving "property for power."
Radin, supra note 88, at 1908.
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consented and, if so, to what. These questions arise when the parties in a
legal dispute offer different versions of the meaning, in context, of their
words and actions; legal decisionmakers then must resolve issues of meaning
by taking sides. Parties can attempt to control interpretation by explaining
themselves clearly in their relationship, but words and actions do not have
fixed meanings apart from external definition. Interpretation at the time of
contract enforcement thus inevitably involves some loss of party control.
In the law of contract, there are elaborate separate bodies of doctrine
concerning formation as opposed to interpretation of content of obligation,
but both sorts of questions involve interpretation. 0 3 Perhaps the major
reason for the special attention given to formation is that consent to
formation is all that is necessary under current contract doctrine for the
law to supply much of the content of obligation, a point that will be
elaborated under the third heading concerning the normative role of contract
law, supplying terms. Consent to all elements of obligation is not possible.
Rather than contract and status being categories that are in opposition, all
contracts have elements of status. Sixty years ago, Williston noted that to
a greater or lesser extent, "once having entered the relationship the rights
and duties of the parties are fixed by rules and laws independent of the
parties."' 4 This is a reason to examine formation questions with special
care, but formation is logically subsumed within interpretation.
Contract law uses a mixed subjective and objective approach to deter-
mine both whether formation has occurred and what is the content of
obligation. 05 If a legal decisionmaker finds an intention of the parties in
common, this governs. In this subjective part of interpretation, judges and
juries look for actual common intent. However, actual intent of a party
can only be proved indirectly. "Ordinary" or "reasonable" meaning is
relevant to, although not dispositive of, the question of shared subjective
meaning. Shared idiosyncratic meaning governs if it can be proved by
external signs."' 6 Because a judge or jury is charged to determine whether
parties had a common intention in the event of a dispute that cannot be
resolved otherwise, parties have an incentive to communicate so as to be
understood by these third parties. This incentive is heightened by the fact
that the law dictates use of an "objective" standard of ordinariness or
103. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 comment a (1979) (stating that questions
of interpretation arise in determining existence of contract as well as in determining rights and
duties under contract).
104. Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CoiuCaa L.Q. 365, 379 (1921). Williston was
more of a relativist concerning freedom of contract than is often supposed: "Observation of
results has proved that unlimited freedom of contract, like unlimited freedom in other
directions, does not necessarily lead to public or individual welfare and that the only ultimate
test of proper limitations is that provided by experience." Id. at 374. This is modernist
thinking. See Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1195,
1213-17 (1989) (discussing modernism and comparing modernism to prerationalism, rationalism
and postmodernism).
105. 1 A. CoP.BN, CONTRACTS § 106 (1963).
106. See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
concurring) (arguing that objective theory went "too far" in treating consideration of actual
intent as irrelevant).
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reasonableness in case of doubt about shared intention.10 7 Those who,
without special effort, communicate in ways that judges and juries under-
stand are advantaged.
The objective test comes into play when a court is not convinced that
the parties had an intention in common; the court must then either find no
contract or that one party is bound to the other's "reasonable" understand-
ing.'10 The usual policy justification for the objective element in interpre-
tation is to protect reasonable reliance on apparent meaning.1' 9 A possibility
in the background of disputes over reasonable meaning is that there really
was no misunderstanding because one party is now lying about his or her
understanding. When this is so, if a court correctly determines the actual
meaning in common by looking for the reasonable meaning, then subjective
intent is served. Thus, the reasonableness test in part guards against man-
ufactured subjective differences in intention.
Where both parties really do have different understandings, yet only
one is deemed reasonable, one party is bound without subjective intent.
This aspect of the objective approach requires potential promisors to be
concerned about how their actions and communications appear to potential
promisees and heightens their concern with what meaning a court will
consider "reasonable."
How is a court to know what external signs mean objectively, whether
one party had a reasonable understanding and the other did not? An
examination of all the circumstances, including the general cultural context,
is appropriate, but it will not mechanically produce a "right" answer.
Parties do not control what will be viewed as reasonable. The law and the
social practice of making contracts can never be perfectly synchronized,
especially given our heterogeneous culture.
Take the "easy" case of mutual assent through offer and acceptance,
labeled as such, of a business deal, obviously a bargain. We have learned
from contract doctrine to think that the parties have gone beyond tenta-
tiveness by labeling a set of communications as an offer and acceptance,
and that they are serious because a real deal is serious business. But is this
really true? If one party does not think making a bargain entails liability
for expectancy loss, why is this contrary to objective appearances? Whose
point of view is the objective one? Stewart Macaulay's empirical work"0
107. An example of parties who do not necessarily communicate in ways judges or juries
understand is cohabiting couples, who may not enter into "bargains" or "contracts" to express
a sense of reciprocal obligation. See Dalton, supra note 12, at 1095-1113.
108. See A. CoRBiN, supra note 105, at § 106; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
20 (1979).
109. This is also the basis of the theory of liability for reliance on a promise. RESTATEmENT
(SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
110. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 20 AM.
Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
Corbin, a good legal realist, realized that rules concerning contract damages are not a
product of the parties' assent, but rather are creations of courts. See 5 A. CoRBIN § 1010
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revealed that the point of view actually adopted by the law as "objective"
may be a legal creation. His study indicated that actual business norms may
be inconsistent with the core principle of contract law that agreement to a
bargain creates liability for expectancy loss. Macaulay found that business
persons did not think that, absent reliance, "cancelling the order" (not to
their way of thinking a "breach of contract") should entail liability."'
The objective test for formation has never seriously sought an empirical
basis. Even if it did do so, no choice of one perspective could be neutral;
such a choice must involve taking sides. The choice of the most common
understanding of a given set of actions and communications, that is, of
"ordinary meaning,"" 2 is not neutral; those with idiosyncratic meanings
are the losers."'
One might argue that, even if initially the law is out of step with
ordinary meaning, the ordinary meaning of legally significant communica-
tions tends to move toward what the law says it is because sophisticated
actors will communicate knowing of the meaning the law ascribes.114 One
problem is that the law's version of objective meaning is more available to
some than to others." 5 Another is that transaction costs are positive, so it
does matter what the legal rule is.116 Legal rules often cause only glacial
movement in the social practice of contracting. Even sophisticated parties
will be constrained and burdened by what the law regards as objective
meaning. The law could attempt to minimize these costs in general by
seeking an empirical basis for its choice of objective meaning," 7 but it
cannot eliminate them or avoid burdening some parties more than others.
One way of understanding the objective element is as a means to reduce
losses caused by misunderstanding. Attention to "ordinary" meaning in
(stating that rule that foreseeable consequential damages are recoverable is based not on an
expression of assent, but rather on judicial policy choice); but see Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa
Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903) (opinion of Holmes, J.) (using fiction of "tacit agreement"
concerning liability for consequential damages).
111. See Macaulay, supra note I10, at 61.
Legal liability for expectancy can be understood, however, as protection of difficult-to-
prove reliance, in the form of not acting. Fuller, supra note 11, at 812.
112. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 8, at 303 (referring to "ordinary meaning"
as basis of consent).
113. Dalton speaks of "coercion" in forcing people to communicate in so-called reasonable
ways in order to assure legal recognition under a reviewing court's chosen objective approach.
See Dalton, supra note 12, at 1044 n.161.
114. Barnett approves of the objective approach because it provides a means of com-
munication that is "available to the parties." See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 8, at
315; see also supra note 18; Fuller, supra note 11, at 801 (discussing channeling function of
formality as way, ideally, for parties to signal to courts and to each other their intention to
be bound).
115. See Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PML. & PoL'Y 179,
200 (1986) (conceding that assumptions of the unsophisticated about law do not necessarily
match background rules of law).
116. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. oF LAw AND EcoN. 1 (1960).
117. Administrative agencies would be better equipped to do this than courts.
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contract interpretation is, however, a blunt instrument for achieving this
end. A direct attempt to reduce losses due to misunderstanding would
require identification of the party who can avoid misunderstanding most
cheaply. An approach based on this efficiency goal would put the burden
of clear communication on the sophisticated, on those who control the
formation and drafting process and who engage in repeated transactions of
the same type and thus learn of common misunderstandings. 118 In cases of
doubt, this approach tends to recognize as reasonable the ordinary meanings
of consumers, employees, franchisees, and small businesses over those of
merchants, employers, franchisors and big businesses. A sophisticated, re-
peat player in the same sort of deal is in the best position to learn of
common misconceptions and to prevent them most cheaply." 9 This approach
has the advantage of being both efficient and fair.
2. Meaning of Text in Context
Whether a question of interpretation involves formation or content of
obligation, the reasonableness of one party's meaning depends on context.
Selection of what is significant in the context gives the court a regulatory
role. The "easiest" type of case raising an issue of consent to the content
of obligation is a dispute in which the parties agree on controlling language,
for instance in a written document. The case is then "merely" one of
interpreting text in context as of the time of formation.
The implications of judicial review according to a reasonableness stan-
dard are more sweeping for content-of-obligation cases than for formation
cases. As to both formation and content, parties have incentives to worry
about how a reviewing court will interpret their words and actions. The
safe thing to do is to communicate in "reasonable" ways. But it is much
harder for parties to communicate successfully to each other and, at the
same time, to potential reviewing courts as to every express term of a
118. The Restatement (Second) can be read as consistent with this economic approach. It
binds Party A to Party B's meaning if Party A has reason to know of Party B's meaning
and Party B has no reason to know of Party A's meaning. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CoNTRAcTs § 20(2)(b) (1979).
119. Sometimes mandatory rules, and not just disclosure, may be necessary to achieve
efficiency for the greatest number because disclosure is not always effective to overcome
common expectations of the unsophisticated. We have learned to be rightly skeptical of
disclosure as a means to achieve efficiency. See Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REv.
131, 157 (1970) (noting that a certain number of consumers will sign a contract document
even if contract has "THIS IS A SWINDLE" embossed on it in electric pink). When it comes
to content of obligation, as opposed to whether there has been formation at all, nondisclaimable
terms, or prohibited terms, may be the only way to achieve efficiency for the greatest number.
See infra note 132. Putting the burden of communication on sophisticated parties may be an
inadequate way to achieve efficiency because it encourages drafters of contract language to
"recur to the attack." Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939). The same
problem may exist in the area of formation. If so, it would be necessary in some sorts of
transactions to have legal rules, rules that cannot be changed by disclosure, addressing when
obligation arises.
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contract, as opposed to communicating only on the question whether they
have formed a contract at all. As a result, courts (or, if you prefer, parties)
are more likely to get content issues wrong than questions about formation.
Generally, the less attention parties give to a matter, the greater the risk of
misinterpretation. The burden of communicating "reasonably" concerning
a number of matters means consent in the sense of party control from the
outset is particularly elusive when it comes to content of obligation. So
much for the "easy" cases, requiring interpretation of text in context.
3. Beyond Text: Interpreting Context
Harder than disputes that call for interpreting text are interpretation
disputes in which the parties disagree about the primary source of content
of the obligation. Consider this sort of example: One party claims that the
language of a written document controls, in the sense that it should be the
focus of interpretation, although of course conceding that its meaning
derives from context at the time of formation. The other party, however,
may claim that the written language does not control (and may never have
done so), but rather the obligation is defined by the parties' relations as a
whole, in particular by later words and actions.'" (This form of argument
120. See Feinman, A Case Study in Critical Contract Law, in ANNUAL StnvnY OF
AwmmucA LAw 273, 277-78 (1988) (giving similar analysis).
Another variation is that the second party claims the writing was not intended to cover
the dispute that has arisen, and the parties never formed any intention on the eventuality in
question in later dealings, so that the obligation must be defined by supplied terms. This sort
of case involves a threshold question of interpretation. If the parties had no intention, then
the court faces an issue of whether to supply a term and, if so, what term. For an example
of this sort of case, see Morin Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Baystone Constr. Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th
Cir. 1983). Morin involved a construction contract dispute between a general contractor and
a subcontractor after the owner rejected aluminum siding put up by the sub on an automobile
plant addition. There was much evidence that the owner acted unreasonably. Morin, 717 F.2d
at 414. The general contractor relied on contract language, including language allowing the
owner to reject based on "artistic effect." Id. The court held that this language, contained in
form documents, did not control when considered in context; the court relied upon a
background rule of law that a condition of satisfaction in a contract involving commercial
quality is subject to a reasonable person standard. Judge Posner, writing for the court, relied
on a rationale of fictional consent, that the rule supplied was "what the parties would have
expressly provided with respect to a contingency that they did not foresee, if they had foreseen
it." Id. at 415. Cf. REsTATrEmENT (SacoND) OF CoNmAcTs § 204 comment d (1979) (rejecting
rationale for supplied terms that "the search is for the term the parties would have agreed to
if the question had been brought to their attention," and favoring rationale that court should
supply term that "comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than
analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining process"). Judge Posner's analysis in Morin
is consistent with his explanation of his wealth maximization theory of law as consensual in
a fictitious sense of consent based on guesses about the choices of most people in hypothetical
markets. See note 39, supra.
Farnsworth would classify the Morin case as one in which the form contract language is
an "overstatement" of expectation, used without the parties actually having an expectation
concerning the matter in question. See Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68
CoLuM. L. REv. 860, 875 n.86 (1968) [hereinafter Omission]. If parties had no intention in
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avoids the strictures of the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule,
actually a complex body of rules, allows prior extrinsic evidence to show
meaning of a writing and also allows evidence of later agreements.,) In
this type of dispute, the parties do not agree on a focus of the interpretive
exercise. Context must be investigated to determine the appropriate focus,
if any.
A court that seeks to adhere to an event model of consent can resort
to the categories of modification and waiver to analyze a case where one
party argues that later actions and words, rather than an initial contract
document, define the content of obligation. A court can also resort to
hierarchies for determining content, such as that express terms are given
greater weight than course of performance. 12 Alternatively, using a relational
approach, a court could examine the whole relation to determine what
priority to give various communications.2 Under the relational approach,
a court must examine context to determine what in the context is most
important. The court's role is not merely to interpret a text or even a text
in context, but to interpret context. Interpreting a legal text is regulation,
and interpreting context can make the regulatory role broader.
Unhinging meaning from text gives the interpreter a greater charter to
find in the context evidence that the parties intended to pursue goals such
as self-definition and participation, and not only wealth maximization.124 If
common, Farnsworth favors using principles of fairness and justice rather than the "facade"
of doing for individuals what they would have done if they had anticipated the situation.
Farnsworth, supra, at 877-79. Farnsworth's analysis was adopted in § 204 of the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND). See RE TATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979). This analysis rejects fictional
consent in favor of candor in acknowledging that a policy choice is necessary.
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 213, 214(c) (1979).
122. See id. at § 203(b).
Macneil has described a whole set of traditional hierarchies in interpretation:
Formal communications such as writings control informal communications; linguistic
communications control nonlinguistic communications; communicated circumstances
control noncommunicated cirumstances; and finally utilization of noncommunicated
circumstances is always suspect.
Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 14, at 893.
123. Macneil, Adjustment, supra note 14, at 894.
124. William Whitford has pointed out that Ian Macneil has two messages; the most
commonly known one is that contracts are relational, and the other is that parties in relational
contracts frequently temper wealth maximization goals with other objectives such as self-
definition and participation in decision-making. See Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to
Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 545, 549-55. As an example of a goal of self-
definition, Whitford gives a franchisee's interest in preserving the relationship with a franchisor,
because losing the franchise means the end of the franchisee's career. Id. at 550. As one
example of participation, Whitford refers to labor-management collective bargaining agreements
and the central tenet of modern labor law that employees should have input into formulating
employment conditions. For another example, Whitford points to collective bargaining between
consumer organizations and manufacturers or sellers in Germany, in which consumer repre-
sentatives have input into what is fair. Id. at 552-54. See A. ETzioM, supra note 13, at 74-75
(stating that "many people work best, and feel less exploited, in contextual relations, in which
they work in part out of moral commitment and are treated as human beings, and not merely
as commodities.").
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one looks at context, one can find in most contractual relations elements
of trust and cooperation. A court can see these as the significant part of
context (where "appropriate") and treat as less significant, or as superceded,
efforts to create a fallback position of distrust expressed in an elaborate
writing.
Is this use of context illegitimate judicial meddling in the parties' affairs,
upsetting the "consent" reflected in the writing? Or is it more faithful to
the parties intentions and aspirations, to "true" consent? Suppose one adds
here that the contract in question is between two business organizations and
that the writing was drafted primarily by one party's law department, with
pages of boilerplate. The business people in both organizations paid scant
or no attention to the boilerplate. They spent their time defining and
adjusting performance expectations in a cooperative spirit.121 In this sort of
situation, free-form examination of context may be a more appropriate
form of interpretation, one that is truer to the spirit of the enterprise and
thus to "consent," than a narrow focus on the writing. To the extent that
interpretation of context is successful in determining true consent and in
backing up norms of cooperation, it is also more efficient (less costly) than
an approach that relies on attempting to force parties into expensive
negotiation and drafting to articulate terms, freezing them at the outset.
Sometimes terms can be worked out better over the course of the relation.
Cooperation and trust may be cheaper as well as more satisfying ways of
conducting a business relationship than suspicious attempts at mutual con-
trol.
The important thing to see is that there is no neutral position on what
the parties meant; the reviewing court has a choice. What did the parties
mean when they executed a writing and then proceeded to cooperate and
adjust their relations for a period of time until relations broke down? A
court can choose to emphasize the writing when the breakdown occurs. The
court can justify this choice as being based on the parties' intentions-why
did they execute the writing unless they wanted it to govern in the event of
disagreement? Or the court can choose to conclude that the writing is an
overstatement of the parties' intentions, 126 and if it ever did reflect their
agreement, it came not to reflect their true, evolved understanding. "Con-
sent" no more clearly dictates one of these choices than the other; the
question is how to define and thus construct consent.
In summary, interpretation makes parties be concerned about the ap-
pearances created by their communications and actions. Interpretation thus
protects reliance and also can be the vehicle for putting the burden of
communication on those in the best position to prevent misunderstanding.
Meeting this burden of communication as to many terms is harder than
125. See Macaulay, supra note 110, at 56 (describing "contractual," as opposed to
"noncontractual" relations, as characterized by planning for contingencies and paying attention
to legal sanctions).
126. See Farnsworth, Omission, supra note 120, at 875 n.86.
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meeting the burden of communication as to only the question of formation
of a contractual relation. In addition, to the extent a relational view of
contract is adopted and consent is viewed as a process, context becomes
not merely the backdrop for interpretation, but the source of obligation to
be interpreted. Interpretation of context can be a basis for finding that the
parties consented to goals of cooperation, trust, and reasonableness not
necessarily expressed in contract documents.
C. Supplying Terms
1. Consent and Efficiency as Rationales
Background law and the courts in particular cases supply many sorts
of terms and conditions without a basis in the parties' expressions or
necessarily implicit in their relations in the sense of being understood by
both. (What is implicit in any relation is open to debate.) These supplied
terms and conditions are provided by many categories of contract doctrine.
They include judicial definition of performance obligations not specified by
the parties (e.g., "reasonable" price, "reasonable" time of delivery),
2 7
stock background terms supplied by law, disclaimable or not, (e.g., implied
warranty of merchantability),'2 general legal standards that modify express
terms and may also supply terms (e.g., the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing),129 excuse doctrines that release parties from obligation based
on unknown conditions (mistake) or unforeseen contingencies (impossibility,
frustration, impracticability), constructive conditions (e.g., fixing order of
performance), and remedies supplied by law. The common label "gap filling
127. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 comment d (1979); U.C.C. § 2-
305(1); U.C.C. § 2-309(l).
128. See U.C.C. § 2-314. Some states have made implied warranties nondisclaimable in
consumer transactions. See Braucher, An Informal Resolution Model of Consumer Product
Warranty Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1405, 1411 n.25.
129. The nature of the obligation of good faith has been debated by Robert Summers
and Steven Burton. See Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968); Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HLv. L. REv. 369
(1980); Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization,
67 CORNELL L. REv. 810 (1982) [hereinafter Good Faith 11]; Burton, More on Good Faith
Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IowA L. REv. 497 (1984).
Although Burton has argued for a more constrained scope to the obligation of good faith
than has Summers, Burton concedes that the good faith obligation may be used to supply
terms where the parties expectations cannot be ascertained. Id. Burton argues that the obligation
of good faith should not, however, be used to override express terms. Id. Even so, a court
that wishes to avoid a direct assault on "freedom of contract" can engage first in interpretation
that finds a term in a writing to be either an overstatement of expectation, see Farnsworth,
supra note 120, at 875 n.86, or an earlier expectation that has been superceded by implicit
modification over the course of the relationship, and then, having cleared away the express
term by interpretation, the court can go on to supply a term. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving
Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
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terms" is a misnomer because the "gaps" the law has to fill generally are
wider than the zones filled in by the parties. 130
Sometimes both parties consciously choose to have terms supplied by a
court or by background law. When parties fail to include essential terms,
in some cases they both do so consciously, knowing that a court will fill
them in if there is a dispute. When the law permits parties to contract out
of background terms and conditions (referred to collectively hereafter merely
as "terms") by supplying their own express terms, the background terms
can be seen as consensual, at least in part. 3 1 Parties who are sophisticated
can contract out, and thus may be consciously adopting the background
terms by not contracting out. Even as to the sophisticated, however, consent
to optional background terms is in part fictional. These parties may not
think of all possible contingencies, and it will be too costly to define all
aspects of the relationship and thus contract out of all background terms
that are undesirable. To see all nonmandatory background terms as con-
sensual is to ascribe too much calculation to parties, even sophisticated
ones, and to underestimate transaction costs. The unsophisticated are usually
unaware of supplied terms, so that the idea that they are consenting to
them is much more likely to be a fiction.
3 2
130. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). Although their analysis has strengths, see
infra text at and following note 135, the adoption of penalty default rules advocated by Ayres
and Gertner might cause fearful drafters to produce endlessly detailed contract documents.
131. Mandatory background terms and prohibited terms are discussed in Part IIA and
note 119, supra, and note 132, infra.
132. See Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, supra note 115, at 200
(discussing example where silence of unsophisticated parties does not indicate assent to
background rules of law).
Disclaimable background terms often do not work well in transactions between a sophis-
ticated and an unsophisticated party. The sophisticated party, who is usually responsible for
drafting the contract document, will decide whether to disclaim or change the background
term, and rarely will the unsophisticated party understand the choice that has been made. For
example, where permitted by law, implied warranties of merchantability and liability for
consequential damages are almost always disclaimed in consumer contract documents. See
Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon Consumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C.L.
Ra,. 835, 836-48 (1977). Consumers are unlikely to understand or even to be aware of such
disclaimers. This has led to mandatory background terms, such as a mandatory implied
warranty of merchantability in consumer sales, an approach that has limited usefulness because
of the unlikelihood that the consumer will litigate. These shadowy terms are based on a
litigation model of consumer dispute resolution and do not provide a good basis for direct
complaints to sellers, the actual forum of most consumer dispute resolution. See Braucher,
An Informal Resolution Model, supra note 128. By contrast, prohibition of certain terms used
against consumers, such as wage assignments and blanket household goods security interests,
is both efficient and likely to have practical effect. If these terms are not in contracts, creditors
cannot use them. See Braucher, Defining Unfairness, supra note 46. Prohibition of terms is
efficient where most consumers would not want them if they understood them and the costs
of getting them explained are prohibitive. The unusual consumers who would choose these
terms are denied the cost reductions and deals that allowing the terms might allow; but this
is done in the interest of giving most consumers what they want at lowest cost. See supra note
90.
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Optional background terms can be explained as serving efficiency by
eliminating transaction costs. Richard Posner describes his normative theory
of law based on wealth maximization as consensual, in a fictitious sense of
consent. 3 3 In this approach, terms are constructed from hypothetical ideal
markets and are consensual in a fictitious sense in that they are designed
to match most people's (assumed) choices under ideal market conditions.
Thus, efficient background terms are those that the parties would have
supplied if they had planned concerning the matter in question (under ideal
market conditions, including perfect information). 34 Under the neoclassical
economic assumption of wealth maximization as the goal of trades, efficient
terms are those that minimize costs (e.g., the terms assign risks to those
who can most cheaply avoid them or minimize their effects and assign
responsibilities to those who can most cheaply perform them). A problem
with supplying wealth-maximizing terms when the parties are silent-without
worrying about how gains are distributed-is that this may lead to strategic
behavior by the sophisticated at the expense of the unsophisticated. 31 One
party may not raise an issue, anticipating either that the second party would
not accept the first party's desired term on the point or would charge dearly
to do so, but later the first party may succeed with a wealth-maximization
argument to get its way in the event of a dispute. While treating all optional
background terms as literally consensual ascribes too much calculation to
many parties, a blanket efficiency approach to supplying terms ascribes too
little strategic calculation to others.
2. Beyond Consent and Efficiency: The Role of Community Standards
In addition to serving efficiency, supplied terms (and prohibited terms)
can serve a goal of setting minimum standards of decency and fairness in
the content of transactions (or other goals such as facilitating self-definition
and participation by parties in the governance of their affairs). Even if
background provisions of law are variable by agreement, agreement to
variations may not be a practical possibility or worth it to the party burdened
by the background provisions. The background provisions thus may be
"sticky." Furthermore, in situations in which it is not possible to create
conditions for valid consent, mandatory, nonvariable supplied terms may
be the only way to achieve both efficiency and decency.
36
If neoclassical economic assumptions are modified to reflect the view
that most people would seek other goals in addition to wealth maximization,
then all supplied terms can be understood as consensual if they reflect the
mix of goals that most people (in our society) would try to write into
133. See Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 39, at 88-89.
134. For an instance of Judge Posner using fictitious consent to supply a term, see Morin
Bldg. Prod. Co., Inc. v. Baystone Constr. Co., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983).
135. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 130, at 93-94.
136. See Part IIA2 and notes 119 and 132, supra, and Braucher, Defining Unfairness,
supra note 46, at 384-86, 394.
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contracts if this were feasible. This explanation expands consent to mean
something like "membership in a society," as Peter Linzer has put it.'1
7
This rationale for supplied terms as based on consent is like Posner's
explanation of wealth maximization as based on consent, with "just" one
difference-it makes a different assumption about what most people want.
This expanded notion of consent assumes that people want wealth, but that
they also have other values than minimizing costs. Under this richer as-
sumption about human nature, the minimum decency, self-definition and
participation parts of the rationale for supplied terms are just as consensual
as the wealth-maximization part. Both efficiency and other goals such as
minimum decency involve fictitious consent, in the sense of being based on
general desires, not necessarily those of the particular parties.
I make the argument that mixed efficiency and decency goals can be
explained in terms of fictitious consent-that is, as based on general desires
of most people-for rhetorical purposes. My preference is to follow the
dictum of the legal realist Karl Llewellyn: "Covert tools are never reliable
tools.' 3t 8 Therefore, the language of consent should not be used to describe
the practice of supplying terms based upon general assumptions about
human nature (which may be in part aspirational, if decency is counted as
a general human desire). To supply terms, a legal decisionmaker must make
policy choices, not merely follow the directives of the parties. The law
should make policy choices explicitly and not mask the choices as "consent."
Neither interpretation nor supplying terms, which are overlapping and
complementary exercises, can be explained fully in terms of consent. Take
for example this type of case: One party claims that a written document
should control, in the sense of being treated as the focus of interpretation.
The other party claims that neither party reasonably considered the language
of the written document controlling on the issue in question, because the
parties in fact had no intention on the contingency that has arisen, and
that a legally supplied term is necessary. There is a threshold question of
interpretation concerning whether the parties had an expectation expressed
in the document or implicit in the context.'3 9 If the court concludes that
there was no expectation, but that it is appropriate to supply a term, what
the court supplies is not based on consent except in a fictitious sense.'
4
0
The parties cannot control in advance what they do not even contemplate.
As previously discussed, interpretation itself goes beyond consent in the
sense of firm and full party control from the outset, because an external
decisionmaker must make a reading of the parties' words and actions. The
lack of party control is particularly clear where the decisionmaker finds
meaning in the relations as a whole. It is only a small step from interpreting
137. Linzer, Consent, supra note 29, at 218.
138. Llewellyn, supra note 119, at 703.
139. See, e.g., supra notes 120 & 129 (discussing Morin); see also Farnsworth, Omission,
supra note 120 (discussing the interrelation of interpreting and supplying omitted terms).
140. See supra note 120 (discussing Morin).
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context without a textual focus to supplying terms; the two rationales may
work together. For example, in the lender liability case K.M.C. Co. Inc. v.
Irving Trust Co.,14t the court relied both on the "history of the relationship"' 42
over several years and on an obligation of good faith in performance,
supplied by law; the court said the lender had a duty to exercise its discretion
reasonably. 43 In the absence of business reasons to the contrary, the court
said that the lender was obligated to give notice of a refusal to advance
funds under the working capital loan agreement between the parties, despite
contract language reserving to the lender the prerogative whether to make
further advances and making all loan amounts repayable on demand. 44
141. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). In this case, Borrower, a wholesale and retail grocery
business, entered into a secured transaction providing for Lender to supply working capital
under a line of credit, secured by inventory and accounts. Borrower was pre-approved for $3
million in credit in 1979 when the financing agreement was first entered into; a year later, the
line of credit was increased to $3.5 million, at a lower interest rate. On March 1, 1982, Lender
refused, without prior notice, to advance $800,000 requested by Borrower, an amount that
would have increased the loan balance to just under the $3.5 million credit limit. Lender
would have been fully secured for the full loan balance, including the $800,000. The refusal
to make the advance left Borrower without funds to cover outstanding checks; the checks
bounced, causing the company to collapse. Id. at 754, 762. Because Borrower's receipts all
went into a blocked account to which Lender had sole access, the refusal to advance funds
left Borrower without essential operating capital. Id. at 759. Three days later, on March 4,
Lender agreed to advance $700,000.
At trial to a jury before a magistrate, Lender failed to explain why its loan officer
refused to make the advance on March 1. There was evidence that a personality conflict
between its loan officer and Borrower's president played a role and that the refusal of the
advance was unreasonable. Id. at 761-62. The jury found Lender liable for breach of contract
and fixed damages at $7.5 million, an amount based on an optimistic assessment of the
Borrower's value. Id. at 755, 766. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the judgment for the Borrower. Id. at 766.
142. Id. at 762.
143. Id. at 759-61. At issue on appeal were a magistrate's instructions to the jury as
follows: that there is implied in every contract an obligation of good faith; that this obligation
may have imposed on Lender a duty to give notice to Borrower before refusing the advance
requested; and that such notice would be required if necessary to the proper "execution"
(presumably meaning performance) of the contract, unless Lender's decision to refuse to
advance funds without prior notice was made in good faith and in the reasonable exercise of
its discretion. Id. at 759.
The court upheld the instruction, finding that Lender's discretion whether to advance
funds was limited by an obligation of good faith performance, as would be its power to
demand repayment (which it equated with an acceleration clause). Id. at 760. In dicta (the
issue was first raised on appeal, improperly), the court said that Lender's discretion must not
only be exercised honestly, but also reasonably, so that the test was what a "reasonable loan
officer" would have done. Id. at 760-61. The court said there was "ample evidence in the
record from which the jury could have concluded that March I simply was not that unusual
a day in the history of the relationship" between Lender and Borrower. Id. at 762.
144. Lender's argument relied on a close reading of contract documents. The court
supplied a term modifying Lender's discretion, finding it subject to a requirement of reason-
ableness. The implied good faith and fair dealing obligation not only modified discretion, to
require reasonableness, it also supplied a requirement of notice. Id. at 759. The requirement
of notice before refusing further advances was not based on any specific provision for notice
in contract documents; it was a term supplied by the court as part of the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing in performance.
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Just as there is no radical division between interpretation and supplying
terms, there is no radical division between consent and "imposed" social
obligation. Consent is socially defined, and social obligation is experienced
by individuals at least in part as legitimate and as part of their identities.
This is true even of individuals in their organizational roles. Consider, for
example, the testimony of two bankers, including an executive vice president
of the defendant, Irving Trust, in the K.M.C. Co. case. They testified that
bankers owe their clients a duty of good faith, a duty that requires notice
of a refusal of an advance where the lender is well secured, as it was in
that case. 45 This testimony is an example of how consent, even in a narrow
sense of conscious agreement, and social obligation are overlapping and
complementary concepts.
One finds the interaction between these concepts at work in the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts, reflecting traditional views. Consider, for
examples, sections 205 (duty of good faith and fair dealing)'" and 204
(supplying an omitted essential term). 147 A comment explaining the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing includes the following language:
Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of
types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they
violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonable-
ness.
41
The two basic purposes of the duty of good faith and fair dealing reflected
in this language, honoring expectations (both subjective and objective)
149
and honoring community standards, are, quite properly, presented as inter-
twined and mutually supportive, rather than contradictory. It can be added
145. Id. at 761-62. The Irving Trust banker, following his employer's theory of the case,
tied the obligation to give notice to a subjective belief that the bank was adequately secured.
Id.
See Comments on Professor Linzer's Paper, 1988 ANN. Sutrv. OF AM. L. 199, 209, in
which Jonathon Eddy, describing his practice experience in lender liability matters, said:
If you get bank counsel and bankers talking among themselves kind of behind closed
doors, in cases where banks get tagged for lender liability, it seems to me often you
get the reaction[:] "Oh, yeah, they really deserved to get nailed in that case. I mean,
the loan officer's action was outrageous."
Id.
146. See RSTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) (providing that "[e]very
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
and its enforcement") (emphasis supplied).
147. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979) (providing that "[w]hen the
parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a
term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable
in the circumstances is supplied by the court").
148. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a (1979).
149. This seems a fair reading of "agreed common purpose" and "justified expectations
of the other party."
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that an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in performance is also
consistent with efficiency because it obviates the need for elaborate expres-
sions of intentions not to weasel or be a jerk. 150 These intentions are, or
ought to be, taken for granted. The is/ought distinction is neither clear nor
very important; the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is experienced
as coming simultaneously from within the party and from the community
without.
Section 204 on supplying terms also reflects a view of consent and
community standards as complementary. The parties must have at least
consented to formation; their bargain must be "sufficiently defined to be
a contract." The Restatement takes this as a sufficient consensual basis for
supplying a reasonable term. A comment explicitly rejects the fiction that
"the search is for the term the parties would have agreed to if the question
had been brought to their attention."'' Rather, it treats as relevant to the
question what is a reasonable term "the probability that a particular term
would have been used if the question had been raised."'' 2 It thus insists on
a rejection of a rationale of fictional consent that excludes community
standards of fairness (i.e., it rejects a rationale based on wealth maximization
only):
[W]here there is in fact no agreement, the court should supply a
term which comports with community standards of fairness and
policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining
process.'
In addition to reflecting a preference for candor, this comment seems to
express a fear that a rationale of fictional consent will assume wealth
maximization as the only goal of bargainers and exclude fairness, a fear
which is understandable given the current ascendance of the neoclassical
economic paradigm of human nature. In addition to the appeal of candor,
it is prudent not to speak of consent when referring to general desires of
people in our society for both wealth and decency until the neoclassical
paradigm has been safely (and decently) buried and a new, richer paradigm
has replaced it.Y
4
150. See Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 39, at 123 (arguing adherence to conventional
virtues reduces policing costs). See also K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761-
62 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting evidence that refusal of advance was unreasonable and that personality
conflict between loan officer and borrower's president contributed to loan officer's decision).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 comment d (1979); Posner prefers to
use language of fictional consent. See, e.g., Morin Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Baystone Constr. Co.,
717 F.2d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 39, at 85-91.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 comment d (1979).
153. Id.
154. See A. ETZIONI, supra note 13, at xii (stating that in making his critiques of
neoclassical economic paradigm he "encountered strong reactions of the kind previously faced
only when he dealt with issues such as the United States involvement in the war in Vietnam,
multilateral nuclear disarmament, and the future of the family").
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The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is fundamentally a-theoretical."'
For example, "contract" is defined in a circular fashion in terms of legal
enforceability. 6 The Restatement does not attempt to give a theoretical
conception of when enforceability is appropriate. Despite the lack of a clear
theory, one observation can be made: the Restatement excludes some
theories. In particular, it excludes any theory premised on a radical division
between individuals and the social community.Y17 It gives a role to expressed,
conscious consent (but defined as requiring attention to others' reasonable
understandings 58 and as based on meaning in context 59) and to efficiency
analysis.60 But the call for "community standards of fairness" in supplying
terms and for "community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonable-
ness" in application of the good faith and fair dealing obligation are clear
instances of the Restatement's rejection of the necessity of consent in a
narrow sense of (highly elusive) party control. The Restatement's call also
goes beyond efficiency. These examples from the Restatement show that
the Restatement is consistent with a more complex theory of contract that
includes a moral dimension to obligation derived from a sense of community.
It should be noted that traditional notions of fair terms may be, more
frequently than not, the same as efficient terms. In a commercial world of
relational contracts, trust and cooperation are essential. A legal approach
that recognizes and promotes these norms reduces the parties' negotiating
155. SpeideI, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L.
REv. 785, 804 (1982) (lamenting that Restatement (Second), in its analysis of supplying omitted
essential terms in § 204, "launches the court into commercial context without a paddle").
While Speidel understands the political necessity of compromise in a restatement, he nonetheless
rues its "failure to articulate a complete theory of contract." Id. at 808. He refers then to
theoretical literature focusing on "economic efficiency, relational theory, moral obligation,
altruism or distributive justice." Id. A restatement that addressed all these theories and
attempted to settle the exact role of each in the law of contract would be lucky to draw more
than one supporter (its drafter).
156. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979).
157. For example, it excludes Randy Barnett's consent theory and Richard Posner's wealth
maximization theory.
158. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 201(2)(b) (concerning whose
meaning prevails) and 20(2)(b) (concerning effect of misunderstanding) (1979).
159. See, e.g., id. at §§ 202 (words and other conduct are interpreted in light of all
circumstances) and 214(c) (evidence of agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous
with the adoption of writing are admissible to show meaning of writing, whether or not
integrated).
160. This is explicit in the Introductory Note and its Reporter's Note in Chapter 16 on
Remedies, Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979). Economic analysis is treated as helpful
but as having problems: "The analysis of breach of contract in purely economic terms assumes
an ability to measure value with a certainty that is not often possible in the judicial process.
The analysis also ignores the 'transaction costs' inherent in the bargaining process and in the
resolution of disputes, a defect that is especially significant where the amount in controversy
is small."
Economic analysis is appropriately part of policy analysis; for example, in the matter of
supplying essential omitted terms, efficiency can be made part of "policy" in the comment
language quoted in the text at note 153, supra.
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and policing costs. Legal rules may also mold values so as to reduce costs
in the long run. Because norms of trust and cooperation are basic to
workable contractual relations, the law should not lightly undercut them on
the basis of arguments about short-term gains.
The communitarian streak in modern contract law is modest but per-
vasive. Contract law sets minimum standards, not high ones, 61 limiting
advantage-taking and requiring other-directedness. Contract is often thought
of as the last liberal bastion, 162 but even here individual autonomy is only
a relative value and one among others. Contractarians should take note.
They are living in a fantasy world if they believe that abandoning noncon-
tractual regulation in favor of contract law would provide release from
social constraints. Contract law is also regulatory.
Conclusion
By insisting on a communitarian dimension to contract law, I do not
mean to suggest that "community" is a magic solution to the specification
and application of norms in the law of contract. Community, like consent,
is in the eye of the beholder; reifying the notion of community would not
be helpful. 63 The increasing talk of community both in legal scholarship
and in the popular media may be in inverse relation to people's actual sense
of connection and reciprocal obligation to each other. 164 In part, we talk
about community out of longing rather than because we really have one.
The question remains: what sort of community do "we" (whoever we are)
want? This brings us back to the task of articulating norms, which is the
only way to interpret and supply much of the content of contractual
obligation.
The work of building and stating norms may not be easy, but before
we can get back to this traditional job of the law, we need to clear away
the suggestion that we can evade the task by simple resort to "freedom of
161. See, Summers, Good Faith II, supra note 129, at 811, 834 (stating that obligation
of good faith and fair dealing is a minimum standard, not a high ideal).
162. See Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 Emics 852,
853, 857 (1989) (distinguishing familial obligations and obligations to one's community or
country from those "chosen or explicitly undertaken through contracting or promising" and
treating contracts between economic agents as opposite of community). To a large extent,
however, contractual obligation is socially defined rather than "explicitly undertaken." Con-
tracts have communal elements.
163. See Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 747, 754 (1989) (discussing
problem that "reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade" may not exist and thus
cannot be used to define obligation).
164. From more venerable expressions such as "the civil rights community" or "the
diplomatic community," there has been a degenerate trend in the identification of "commu-
nities" in the media. Thus, we see references to the likes of "the lending community" or "the
investment banking community." The nadir in this trend was reached on August 23, 1989,
when Robert MacNeil referred on the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour to "the drug-trafficking
community," a Hobbesian sort of "community" indeed. MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour (television
broadcast, Aug. 23, 1989).
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contract." The legal institution of contract itself requires elaborate nor-
mative definition in three dimensions. First, there are interrelated questions
about validity of consent and the social limits of consent as a rationale for
using state force against a now unwilling contract party. To answer these
questions, we need a positive conception of liberty, one which identifies its
minimum conditions, rather than seeing liberty as merely "freedom from"
particular constraints. We also need a positive conception of limits to
enforcement of contracts, with the limits seen as a means to foster freedom
rather than to restrict it. Second, interpretation of contracts can only be
done from some point of view, which means that it inevitably carries
normative baggage. Self-consciousness about this baggage can help us make
better choices about which parties should bear the burden of communication.
Third, law must supply much of the content of contractual obligation.
Particularly when long-term effects are considered, the "fair" terms pro-
duced by traditional views drawn from community standards promote rather
than undercut market institutions. In the legal activities of interpreting and
supplying contract terms, we should be wary of approaches that sacrifice
norms of trust, cooperation and participation for supposed short-term gains.
Legal approaches that can be reconciled with both efficiency and fairness
have the best chance of sustaining productive contractual relationships in
the long run.
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